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An Idea of American Indian Land Justice:  
Examining Native Land Liberation in the New Progressive Era 
By Richael Faithful 
 
Introduction 
 
 Celebrated contemporary political philosopher and economist Amartya Sen, in the 
introductory chapter of his recent work, The Idea of Justice,
1
 describes a classical distinction in 
East Indian
2
 jurisprudence between niti and nyaya. Niti is represented by matsyanyaya or ―justice 
in the world of fish,‖ and nyaya represents whole justice.3 Matsyanyaya, according to his 
narrative, is justice where fish may freely swim but large fish dominate the water because they 
are free to devour smaller fish.
4
 East Indian legal theorists rebuke matsyanyaya for the reason 
that a world of this kind—where smaller fish are inevitably endangered for the mere reason that 
they are small—seems intuitively unfair.5 Matsyanyaya, they argue, suggests that justice is a 
purely personal matter that hinges on individual moral choices. But, they ask, is not justice 
something more? This ―something‖ is embodied by a concept known as nyaya. Nyaya reflects 
societies‘ willingness to judge themselves as well as their principles, institutions, and conduct in 
relation to justice. These East Indian thinkers believe that nyaya ought to represent justice in the 
world of humans, for it is justice that makes up the metaphorical water in which we humans 
swim.  
                                                          
1
 AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 20 (2009) (advancing a political theory of justice developed from decades‘ 
critiques of John Rawls‘ preeminent theory of justice). 
 
2
 This article compares ideas from continental Indian philosopher Amartya Sen and American Indian scholar, Robert 
Odawi Porter. To avoid confusion, I will designate ―East Indian‖ for continental India and ―American Indian‖ for 
American Indian tribes.  
 
3
 Id. 
 
4
 Id.  
 
5
 Id.  
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 In the Tewa tribal tradition there is a story that explains how the Tewa People found 
themselves in San Juan, California. It begins with a Great Drought.
6
 The fish people were 
responsible for offering prayers to the Great Spirit, so they assembled to fast, pray, and sacrifice 
in a secluded kiva until the rain came as was custom. A woman named Fee-ne-nee was 
responsible for their daily feeding.
7
 On the third night, one of the men could no longer stand the 
isolation, and suffering from thirst, secretly left to the nearby lake, and drank until he could do so 
no more.
8
 He quietly returned to the fish people, but his water-filled body burst when he entered 
the kiva.
9
 Water poured out of his head, eyes, mouth, arms, body, and legs—soon the other fish 
people turned into fish, frogs, and other water animals.
10
 The next day when Fee-ne-nee arrived, 
she saw water gushing into the air and water animals swimming in the torrent.
11
 She returned to 
the village to the first house she saw, home to an old man and wife.
12
 When she entered the 
house she turned into a snake.
13
 The old woman and man knew that something happened at the 
kiva and that this was a bad omen for the village people.
14
 After placing the young woman in a 
                                                          
6
 AMERICAN INDIAN MYTHS AND LEGENDS 415 (Richard Erdoes & Alfonso Ortiz, eds. 1984).   
 
7
 Id.  
 
8
 Id. 
 
9
 Id.  
 
10
 Id.  
 
11
  AMERICAN INDIAN MYTHS AND LEGENDS 416 (Richard Erdoes & Alfonso Ortiz, eds. 1984).   
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 Id.  
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 Id.  
 
14
 Id.  
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snake burrow east of the village, the old couple returned, crying.
15
 They told their people that the 
law required them to move from their home, O-Ke-owin, and find another place to live.
16
  
 Justice and displacement are intractable cultural themes that continue to be enormously 
relevant today. What is fair is strongly correlated to the story of where people are and how they 
got there. This Tewa story contains a tangled historical tapestry for America‘s First Peoples who, 
in large part, have been displaced from their ancestral lands to places unlike their homes. The 
Tewa story tells about a certain kind of displacement, one which is dictated by the Great Spirit‘s 
law. But many other American Indian displacement stories tell about ―justice in the world of 
fish‖ where tribes were forced or pressured into leaving their homelands by invaders. In this 
way, East Indian philosophy is connected to American Indian history because both narratives 
meet at a universal-political theology. The spiritual and political commitment to liberation, as 
well as the legal and ethical commitment to justice, is long-sought by peoples throughout the 
world. Relating among strains of justice-seeking traditions—Indian, Euro-Western, and 
American Indian—is crucial for universal improvement toward justice.  
I would like to discuss the matter of justice in this spirit. This article aims to achieve two 
goals: to begin articulating American Indian land justice policy proposals as we approach a 
progressive horizon, and to re-ignite advocates‘ imagination about land justice to usher 
movement toward the horizon. The article also contains two levels of analyses. On the first level, 
it examines connections between a contemporary theory of justice, developed by East Indian 
thinker, Amartya Sen, and an emerging American Indian law land-justice proposal, introduced 
by American Indian law scholar, Robert Odawi Porter. This comparison shows how Western 
                                                          
15
 Id.  
 
16
 AMERICAN INDIAN MYTHS AND LEGENDS 416 (Richard Erdoes & Alfonso Ortiz, eds. 1984).   
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justice theoretical developments parallel existing American Indian justice theory and how these 
theories can mutually inform each other.
17
 On the second level, this article further investigates 
Professor Porter‘s legal vision called ―land liberation,‖18 as a vehicle to realize American Indian 
justice. I argue that we must recognize new opportunities to deliver justice as they emerge, like 
land liberation, while the global-political climate around justice quickly transforms. This article 
re-visits American Indian land rights‘ discussions on moral entitlements, judicial autonomy, and 
tribal sovereignty in a changing socio-political, human rights context, during which the potential 
for land justice is as ripe as ever.    
Part I of this article generally maps out the land liberation vision put forth by Robert 
Odawi Porter. Part II compares the land liberation vision to Amartya Sen‘s newest contribution 
on political justice theory, The Idea of Justice. Part III examines land liberation in more detail—
its implications and possibilities—focusing on the ―plenary power problem,‖ and ―loss of trust 
problem.‖ Part IV finally concludes by identifying new opportunities to realize the land 
liberation vision in an Obama era.  
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 This article does not intend to assign value to either theory as each theory fits its unique context and purposes.  
Few commentators, however, have given credit to first peoples‘ contributions to international legal and social 
theory. See S. James Anaya, Indian Givers: What Indigenous Peoples Have Contributed to International Human 
Rights Law, 22 WASH. U. J. L. & POL‘Y 107 (2006) (arguing that indigenous peoples have taken advantage of, and 
contributed toward, the fast-paced development of international human rights law).  
 
18
 Amartya Sen offers an interesting perspective about the inter-relatedness between norms and law. See AMARTYA 
SEN, Normative Evaluation and Legal Analogue in NORMS AND THE LAW 250 – 251(John N. Drobak ed. Cambridge 
Press 2006)(contending that normative moral rights and duties are understood by their legal analogues and that as 
such, law and law-making inform moral norms as much as norms inform law). If law not only reflects norms but 
influences them, then the political goal of this article is, in part, to inspire legal re-imagination as a vehicle for social 
change for American Indian emancipation.  
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I. Land Liberation Vision  
 
Over the last year, Indian law scholar, Robert Odawi Porter, has called for the Obama 
administration to assist tribes in achieving land liberation.
19
 Land liberation, in his view, is the 
federal government‘s return of trust land to tribal sovereigns.20 His argument relies on a 
compelling rationale that the absence of tribal ownership over land inherently limits tribal 
sovereignty and in many instances, prevents tribes from achieving economic self-sufficiency.
21
 
Porter believes that Indian control over vital land resources will emancipate tribes from their 
dependent-nation status from the federal government.
22
  
I should preface this Article with the acknowledgment that Professor Porter has not 
directly written on his land liberation proposal, though, I believe that much of the land liberation 
vision is embodied in his work about tribal sovereignty. This Article is my iteration of his vision, 
notably from a non-Indian perspective, and it is one that skims the surface of many details and 
implications of a tangible proposal. My hope is that this Article may invite Indian advocates and 
scholars to join leftist Indian voices in exploring this vision and proposal during a time of 
potential socio-political transformation across the world. 
                                                          
19
 Beyond Land-into-Trust: Creative Land Ownership Options for Tribes, DC Indian Law Conference, and 
November 13, 2009 (proposing the theoretical idea of land liberation as an available opportunity for further 
investigation during the Obama administration).  
 
20
 Id.  
 
21
 Id.  
 
22
 The dependent-sovereign or diminished sovereignty doctrine is one of the three foundational Indian law principles 
originating from the Marshall Trilogy. See Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (designating 
tribes, which reside within U.S. territorial boundaries but exist as independent sovereign nations, as ―domestic 
dependent nations‖ under Congress‘ plenary power). The other two doctrines include the plenary power doctrine and 
trust doctrine. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823) (declaring the discovery doctrine application 
to tribes); Worcester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (establishing an implicit trust relationship 
between the U.S. federal government and tribes).  See also Robert O. Porter, The Inapplicability of American Law to 
Indian Nations, 89 IOWA L. R. 1595, 1597-1598 (2004)(criticizing American Indian legal scholars and practitioners 
for analyzing foundational doctrines but failing to examine the broader context of American Indian jurisprudence as 
―the law of the colonizing nation‖).  
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I believe that Porter‘s land liberation vision is a remarkable suggestion that warrants 
serious consideration. Such a vision poses a set of ethical questions and another set of legal 
questions. I intend to briefly address each set of questions in this article. Porter‘s moral vision is 
persuasive because it draws from his and other Indian law scholars‘ work which argues for 
genuine tribal sovereignty and recompense for harm suffered.
23
 These arguments are 
independently strong, but I hope to offer insights from a comparative examination of Western 
philosophical thought, American Indian jurisprudence, and intuitive thinking about United 
States-American Indian justice. The values and goals underlying these theories are similar and 
inform how we should concretize these visions moving forward.     
From such a vantage point, it is easy to see why a strong supporter of tribal sovereignty, 
like Robert Porter, is attracted to an idea like land liberation. Land restoration, which is the 
return of tribal land title from federal government trust, would allow tribes to independently 
execute their own land-related laws
24
 and policies that open opportunities for a range of 
sovereign powers, including renewable energy production and gaming development.
25
 The 
                                                          
23
 Some of the most prominent law scholars‘ voices for American Indian emancipation from federal government 
supremacy, reparations, and entitlements in addition to Robert Odawi Porter, are Robert Williams Jr., Ward 
Churchill, and William Bradford. William Bradford, in particular, has written extensively on U.S.-American Indian 
reconciliation. See generally Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 OHIO STATE L.J. 1 
(2005) (assessing a range of justice models to administer tribal relief which include reparations, restitution, public 
apologies, and policy reform); The HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE 
STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION (2008) (emphasizing 
the importance of sovereignty in dictating tribes‘ economic capacities and futures).    
 
24
 See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change, 78 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1625 (2007) (arguing for indigenous right for self-determination to avoid genocidal costs resulting 
from nations‘ climate change adaptation strategies). 
 
25
 See Alice Kaswan, Greening the Grid and Climate Justice, 39 ENTL. L. 1143, 1152-1153 (2009) (stating that 
while American Indian advocates see opportunities for renewable energy development, tribes usually lack start-up 
capital for projects, which, therefore, requires private investment; this option, however, is hindered by heavy federal 
regulation over tribal development that requires federal approval.). See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing 
7 
 
provocative idea of land liberation offers, at least principally, some pathway through which tribal 
governments can better address ever-changing tribal conditions, particularly for those who view 
American Indian law foundational principles as perhaps primarily designed to maintain non-
Indian control over Indians.
26
  
It is, nonetheless, land liberation‘s legal questions that are less clearly understood. Land 
liberation, quite frankly, undermines a large portion of American Indian law, which could be a 
positive turn of events.
27
 It also creates a vast world of uncertainty which may negatively affect 
tribes at least in the short-term. Land restoration alone, however, cannot guarantee land liberation 
for two reasons.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 39, 41-42 (2007)(arguing that the over-reaching federal 
regulatory scheme on Indian gaming severely disadvantage tribes by mandating state revenue-sharing and by 
weakening their bargaining power in compact negotiations); Ezra Rosser, This Land Is My Land, This Land Is Your 
Land: Markets and Institutions for Economic Development on Native American Land, 47 ARIZ. L. R. 245, 268-278 
(2005) (explaining how land alienation restrictions placed on individual and tribal reservation land prevents 
possibilities for long-term wealth development); Robert Miller, American Indian Entrepreneurs: Unique 
Challenges, Unlimited Potential, 40 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1297 (2008) (surveying the complex matrix of bureaucratic 
challenges that deter Indian entrepreneurship despite its promise to lift many Indians from poverty). But see also 
Wambdi A. WasteWin, Tribal Nation Economics: Rebuilding Commercial Prosperity in spite of U.S. Trade 
Restraints—Recommendations for Economic Revitalization in Indian Country, 44 TULSA L. REV. 383 
(acknowledging tribal market sophistication and resilience in traditional trade and commerce).         
  
 
26
 See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF 
CONQUEST (1990)(introducing a critical race analysis to American Indian law and history in a description of the role 
of imperialism and power in American jurisprudence toward Indians); Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. R. 21, 22 (2005)(claiming that the Court altogether foreclosed 
the option of tribal land restoration, at the time, when it established the ―doctrine of discovery‖ in Johnson v. 
McIntosh); William Bradford, “Another Such Victory And We Are Undone”: A Call to American Indian Declaration 
of Independence, 40 TULSA L. R. 71, 72 (2004)(arguing that Indians have been ―saddled‖ with the European-
American problem which is a political and legal system created with the sole purpose of preserving the ―might of the 
conqueror‖); Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, & Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United 
States, 28 GA. L. R. 453, 458-467 (1993-1994)(recounting various methods by which the U.S. federal government 
exercised or facilitated American Indian land dispossession through fraud, threats, and policy coercion); Nell Jessup 
Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations,132 UNIV. OF PENN. L. R. 195, 196 
(explaining that the judiciary have ―labored‖ to clarify federal control over Indians, yet when tribal sovereignty is 
considered, the U.S. Constitution provides no guidance other than federal control). 
 
27
 See Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, United States Government Printing Office, 91 (1945) 
available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/cohen/5cohen89.pdf (asserting that federal government power over Indian tribes or 
tribal members is as far-reaching as its power of citizens that it is essentially ―plenary‖).  
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First, there is the ―plenary power‖ problem. Even if title is transferred from one sovereign 
to another, the federal government reserves almost unfettered, constitutionally-based, plenary 
power over tribes.
28
 For tribes to enjoy genuine land liberation they must be afforded full 
freedom to make land use decisions, free of U.S. meddling that may effectively nullify or amend 
tribal decisions.
29
  
Second, land restoration creates a ―loss of trust‖ problem, which may undermine tribal 
sovereignty or threaten tribal well-being. Some tribes, especially smaller ones or ones with fewer 
resources, may not possess the political will to abandon the federal trust model, preferring 
instead precarious trusteeship over potential loss of federal funding and programs.
30
 Although 
relinquishing land trusteeship does not necessarily eliminate the federal government trust 
relationship with tribes in its entirety, such a shift may fundamentally change or eviscerate the 
modern fiduciary-trust doctrine.
31
  
                                                          
28
 See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. at 515 (holding that state jurisdiction is repugnant to United States‘ 
Constitution, treaties, and federal laws); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (holding that the federal 
Major Crimes Act was applicable to tribes despite tribal sovereignty due to constitutional plenary power); Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding federal allotment policy on congressional plenary power 
grounds). 
 
29
 See Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community: Reflections on Native Sovereignty and Property in America, 
34 IND. L. REV. 1291, 1298 (2000) (observing that in the historically-tied relationship between land rights and tribal 
sovereignty that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that divests tribal government authority to regulate trust land, 
ultimately weakens tribal sovereignty).  
 
30
 See Ezra Rosser, The Trade-off Between Self-Determination and the Trust Doctrine: Tribal Government and the 
Possibility of Failure, 58 ARK. L. REV. 291, 349-340 (2005-2006) (acknowledging that tribes may fear tipping the 
balance of a delicate trust-sovereignty scale because meaningful sovereignty presents uncertainty around tribal 
governmental capacity). 
 
31
 The modern trust doctrine defines the federal government‘s fiduciary trust relationship with Indian tribes or tribal 
members as opposed to the original doctrine which relied on treaties and agreements. The fundamental ―guardian-
ward‖ rationale, however, remains intact. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (holding that statutes 
and regulations established fiduciary federal government trust responsibility to manage property for Indians); Cobell 
v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (2001) (holding that a fiduciary relationship exists when the federal government takes 
elaborate control over tribal monies or properties even without express statutory authorization).    
 
9 
 
Many tribes also may face the real threat of state encroachment without federal trust 
―guardianship.‖ States, from one perspective, are likely to exercise improper legal power over 
tribal land to lay claim over natural resources.
32
 Still, others may argue that illegitimate state 
encroachment is a favorable risk compared to legally-sanctioned federal encroachment on tribal 
resources, government, and people. Conceptually speaking, the loss of trust problem poses hard 
questions about desirability, risk, and fairness, which must be thought-through in the land 
liberation vision.  
I should stress that land restoration is not a new idea, academic idea or legal idea. It is 
embodied in the American Indian liberation struggle itself.
33
 It is embodied from the mournful 
Cherokee Trial of Tears to Lakota Indian Wounded Knee Massacre. It takes on a new meaning, 
however, in an anti-colonial, human-rights era. Because land liberation and human rights visions 
look in the same justice-oriented direction, it is valuable to explore their connections and assess 
their applications to the protracted United States-American Indian land conflict.   
 
                                                          
32
 The federal government enjoys plenary power over Indians affairs, however, states may exercise jurisdiction 
under limited circumstances when state interests are arguably involved. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) 
(holding that state regulation applies to non-Indians who allegedly commit an on-reservation crime). However, 
states may over-reach its legitimate jurisdiction when lucrative resources or enterprise is at stake. See generally 
Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal Sovereignty, 55 S. D. L. R. 48 
(2010) (arguing that the era of ―self-determination‖ for Indian tribes is diminished against recent federal and state 
encroachment on tribal sovereignty); see also Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, Negotiating Meaningful Concessions from 
States in Gaming Compacts to Further Tribal Economic Development: Satisfying the “Economic Benefits” Test,  54 
S. D. L. R. 421-422 (2009) (explaining that a considerable non-Indian constituency challenge tribal claims over 
gaming revenues in legislatures and courts even though tribes maintain stronger claims and possess a greater 
economic development need).   
 
33
 See Robert Odawi Porter, Tribal Disobedience, 11 TEX. J. ON CIV. LIB. &  CIV. RTS. 137, 318 (recognizing that 
indigenous peoples in the Americas have employed a variety of advocacy strategies to defend their interests, 
including warfare, diplomacy, litigation, lobbying, and tribal disobedience). Some advocates have moved toward a 
self-defined conception of sovereignty to re-center Indian extra-legal experiences for liberation. See Wallace Coffey 
& Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of 
Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 191, 197 (urging for Indian law scholars and advocates to re-define 
sovereignty to integrate an internal sovereignty notion—cultural sovereignty—into popular sovereignty conceptions 
to more deeply locate land and home analogies that are central to Indian survival). 
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II. New Meanings of Freedom, Rights, & Justice 
 
A New Idea of Justice 
Amartya Sen‘s recent work, The Idea of Justice, both contributes to, and departs from, 
John Rawl‘s seminal 1971 work, A Theory of Justice.34 A Theory of Justice, regarded today as 
among the most important political philosophy models of the twenty-first century, laid out 
Rawls‘ foundational equality principles for institutionally-based societies to achieve justice. 
Rawls‘ theory imagined a scenario in which free and rational persons would agree to accept 
equality as a term of association and facilitate consensus-building on two conditions.
 35
  The first 
condition is ―justice as fairness,‖36 which is the social ideal to be reached within the Rawlsian 
imagination. The second condition is called the ―original position,‖ where all persons involved in 
the agreement process are stripped of vested interests under a ―veil of ignorance.‖37 Once these 
two conditions are established, a set of persons known as ―legislators‖ enter agreement stages to 
reach consensus on other regulatory principles and institutions. Thus, consented-upon principles 
emerging from this set of agreements are adopted by society and culminate into a more equal 
society. Rawls distinct vision certainly revitalized the topic of justice among political 
philosophers, and slowly shifted the imaginative paradigm on justice over the last forty years.  
The Idea of Justice, in contrast, is the accumulation of Sen‘s critiques of A Theory of 
Justice over several decades. Sen describes Rawls‘ ―justice as fairness‖ doctrine as ―deeply 
                                                          
34
 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press, Harvard University Press 1999) (1971). 
 
35
 Id. at 10.  
 
36
 Rawls emphasizes that his conception of justice centers on rational fairness and its relation to social life, otherwise 
known as ―social justice.‖ Equality, liberty, and their social relations constitute the essence of the ―justice as 
fairness‖ principle. See id. at 6-10.  
 
37
 Id.   
 
11 
 
relevant‖ to modern justice theories, including his own.38 Yet he criticizes Rawls‘ other main 
premises as being ―seriously defective.‖39  The Idea of Justice attempts to improve upon Rawls‘ 
theory with a strong emphasis on the delivery of equality to persons in a just society. The most 
relevant contribution from Sen, within an American Indian law context, is his sharp departure 
from a transcendentalist or institution-driven approach.
40
 His vision has a unique emphasis on 
human capabilities. This person-centered vision, which has the potential to be  invoked by the 
land liberation vision, supplants the political motivations behind full tribal sovereignty 
restoration.
41
  
Sen‘s theory builds on Rawls‘ ―justice as fairness‖ principle, and, at the same time, 
responds to its shortcomings. The ―justice as fairness‖ principle, in Sen‘s view, can be reduced to 
the societal value of impartiality—free from bias, interests, and prejudices—in the evaluation of 
primary goods distribution.
42
 Rawls‘ impartiality, within the original position, is achieved under 
a ―veil of ignorance,‖ which identically (dis)advantages choice-makers who are detached from 
                                                          
38
 IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 54.  
 
39
 Id. at 53. See also AGAINST INJUSTICE: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF AMARTYA SEN 47 (Reiko Gotoh & Paul 
Dumouchel eds., 2009) (making a general critique about Rawls‘ theory that although it is an economic-justice 
proposal, its transcendentalist roots (focus on creating a perfectly just society), in essence, contravenes an economic 
analysis, which, instead, is comparatively-oriented.) Sen elaborates on this point in The Idea of Justice, yet it is a 
more over-arching criticism about Rawls chosen approach that he addresses throughout his body of work. 
 
40
 Transcendentalism is defined as ―a philosophy that emphasizes the a priori conditions of knowledge and 
experience or the unknowable character of ultimate reality or that emphasizes the transcendent as the fundamental 
reality.‖ See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/transcendentalism (last visited May 14, 2010). Transcendentalism, in philosophical theory 
of justice terms, denotes a certain set of values or goals is reached by virtue of a procedural mechanism, system, or 
process.  
 
41
 See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIMES, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 32 – 52 (1987)(arguing that most philosophers agree that sovereignty is absolute, 
indivisible, and unlimited, which implies that the primary challenge of tribes is to maintain its prerogatives against 
time  in the modern federal Indian law). 
 
42
 IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 114 - 123.  
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individual benefits deriving from any particular choice. Sen‘s theory challenges two Rawlsian 
assumptions: that individual liberty would emerge as the foremost principle from consensus and 
that equality of resources equated to equal qualities of life. He correctly argues that these beliefs 
are assumptions that require a further investigation.
43
   
Sen concludes that Rawls‘ assumptions about liberty and equal primary goods distribution 
are fatal to his theory of justice. He, instead, offers a new model, which retains the ―justice as 
fairness‖ principle, yet establishes the following:   
1. People‘s actual behaviors—not institutions—must serve as the bedrock for just institutions;44  
2. Adam Smith‘s ―Impartial Spectator‖ (I.S.) approach better facilitates fair political choice-
making than the classic social contract approach;
45
 
3. Universal decision-making models are more relevant today than isolated nation-state models 
in an increasingly global political environment.
46
  
 
The Idea of Justice consists of the ―justice as fairness‖ principle and these three 
improvements from Rawls‘ theory. Sen‘s improvements rely on notions that reject classic neo-
liberalism, which progressive leftists believe has failed to address some of  the world‘s most 
pressing and enormous problems, like poverty, environmental degradation, and political 
marginalization.
47
 An improved theory of justice model should speak to neo-liberalism‘s failures 
and offer insight into how to solve endemic issues facing societies across the world today. 
                                                          
43
 THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 65-66.  
 
44
 Id. at 67-72.  
 
45
 Id.  
 
46
 Id.  
 
47
 See Noam Chomsky, Power and Globalization in the New World Order in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
GLOBALIZATION AND ANTIGLOBALIZATION 159 (Henry Veltmeyer ed., 2008) (―In old fashioned terms, this situation 
would have been called ‗class war‘…Their victims should certainly resist the predictable exploitation of crisis, and 
should focus their own efforts, no less relentlessly, on the primary issues that retain much as they were before: 
among them, increasing militarism, destruction of the environment, and a far-reaching assault against democracy 
and freedom, the core of ‗neoliberal‘ programs‖); MARCUS G. RASKIN, LIBERALISM: THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN 
IDEALS 186-187 (―What is clear is that the present dominant policies of the United States are dystopian…The liberal 
13 
 
American Indian tribes continue to overcome many of these endemic social problems, 
despite the fact that opportunities to address them are within reach.
48
 Worse, continual tribal 
sovereignty erosion further limits tribes‘ ability to enforce their laws and govern their lands.49 
The modern neo-liberal state‘s refusal to fully restore tribal sovereignty denies tribes the ability 
to independently act on problems such as reservation poverty, resource preservation, and other 
challenges without bureaucratic obstruction.
50
 Should a true tribal self-determination era actually 
arrive, it is imperative to consider which new policy or jurisprudential principles will emerge.
51
 
While some jurists may express unwillingness to abandon the guardian-ward model, a remedial 
―justice as fairness‖ doctrine is a viable alternative foundation to Federal Indian law as it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
hope of integrating the wretched and the working class into a world system of manageable decency, as Immanuel 
Wallerstein put it, will have failed‖); Laura Macdonalad & Arne Ruckert, POST-NEOLIBERALISM IN THE AMERICAS 4 
(Laura Macdonald & Arne Ruckert eds., 2009)(discussing diverging opinions about neo-liberalism‘s success but 
acknowledges that the neoliberal model has become discredited in the United States and lags in expectations for the 
―developing world‖ particularly in Latin America where many countries have moved toward a populist socialism).  
 
48
 About twenty-five percent of American Indians and Alaska Natives were living below the poverty level in 2004 
compared to nine percent of non-Hispanic Whites. See U. S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY—AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVES: 2004 16 (2007). Numerous opportunities exist 
for tribal economic development, yet statutory impediments have slowed growth. Gavin Clarkson has written 
extensively on various statutes‘ negative impact on tribes. See Accredited Indians: Increasing the Flow of Private 
Equity into Indian Country as a Domestic Emerging Market, 80 U. COLO. L. R. 285 (2009) (criticizing existing 
securities laws as starving private business growth within reservations).  
 
49
 See Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between The Constitution, The Marshall Trilogy, and United States v. 
Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM, 651, 687-688 (2009) (arguing that tribes‘ jurisdiction enigma, involving tribal, state, and federal 
governments, often leads to de facto lawlessness). 
 
50
 I do not mean to suggest that federal support is necessarily obstructive to tribal sovereignty. I merely want to 
observe that the absence of full tribal sovereignty limits tribal freedom to execute decisions regarding their own best 
interests. It is possible that tribal interests are best served with transitory reparative support. See Beyond 
Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice , supra note 23, at 61 (explaining that Justice as Restoration 
advocates advance rehabilitative support  as a means to heal harmed tribal communities) Rehabilitative support may 
morally obligate the federal government to provide dollars for tribal healing—tangible and non-tangible—for 
America‘s original ―imposition.‖    
 
51
 See Pommersheim, supra note 32. Robert Porter, for example, has suggested that America‘s legal approach to 
tribes has remained essentially the same so that a true self-determination era would have to radically depart from this 
history. See Robert Odawi Porter, American Indians and the New Termination Era, 16 CORN. J. L. & PUB. POLICY 
473, 473-474 (2007) (arguing against conventional wisdom that congressional American Indian policy is cyclical, 
claiming instead that an assimiliationist agenda has driven federal government policy choices for the last 200 years).  
 
14 
 
currently exists. The ―justice as fairness‖ doctrine presumes full tribal sovereignty recognition, 
turning the inquiry from whether tribes can exercise sovereign authority to which equitable 
remedies are appropriate to restore full sovereignty. In a broad sense, a ―justice as fairness‖ 
foundation may assist jurists and pro-sovereignty advocates in the difficult undertaking of re-
orienting Indian law, yet it may not be enough to propel its positive direction.
52
 Sen‘s Idea of 
Justice may serve as an engine to drive non-Indian jurists toward American Indian land justice. 
But why is this theory so important to American Indian land justice? I suggest four reasons. 
First, it may be the first major development in political philosophical thinking on justice, since 
John Rawls‘ theory of justice.53 Second, as mentioned earlier, it serves as a natural complement 
to existing American Indian justice theories
54
 that advocate for co-extensive nation sovereignty. 
It is a Western philosophical theory of justice analogue that, in its application, makes a parallel 
case (on behalf of non-Indian allies) for Indian justice. Third, it is in tandem with, and is borne 
by, international social justice struggles and trends (e.g. indigenous and human rights 
movements) that are slowly penetrating American law.
55
 Finally, its flexibility is ideal not only 
for complex, twenty-first century problems, but it is an ideal transitory model as cultural values, 
                                                          
52
 I suggest here that a new progressive era in the United States ushered in by global-political transformation may 
influence jurists thinking about the demands and justice and re-shape their thinking about Indian law‘s basic tenets 
of which the ―justice as fairness‖ doctrine may be a key element in a new political environment. See also Siegfried 
Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights on Indigenous 
Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANS-NAT‘L L.  1141, 1152 - 1159 (discussing indigenous peoples‘ success in creating 
political pressure for the international community to implement laws and mechanisms designed to finish the de-
colonization project and to assert their peoples‘ sovereign powers to establish and execute their own laws). 
 
53
 See, e.g., Carlin Romano, Amartya Sen Shakes Up Justice Theory, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Sept. 
14, 2009 available at http://chronicle.com/article/Amartya-Sen-Shakes-Up-Justice/48332.  
 
54
 See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 23, at 69-100 (establishing a ―Justice as Indigenism‖ theory of justice that outlines 
a detailed truth and reconciliatory process for the United States government and tribes). 
 
55
 See Hon. Michael Kirby, Constitutional Law and International Law: National Exceptionalism and the Democratic 
Deficit?, 98 GEO. L. J. 433, 443 (explaining that while American law does not traditionally rely on international 
sources interpreting its own laws, a line of recent, controversial cases have relied on international authority 
including, Atkins v. Virginia, Lawrence v. Texas, and Roper v. Simmons).  
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identity politics, and legal norms evolve. The Idea of Justice and land liberation synergize 
momentum away from neo-liberal dependent-sovereignty toward new-era self-determination. 
The next section will examine Sen‘s critiques of Rawls‘ theory of justice and similarly, explain 
how the modern neo-liberal state fails to establish American Indian land justice. 
A Theory of Justice Critique 
The Idea of Justice is a strong competing theory to John Rawls‘ breakthrough theory of 
justice. Sen introduces three major critiques in his theory that relate to modern American Indian 
law, though, he never explicitly applies his theory to Native land justice. Critical law scholars 
have expressed the need for sovereignty-based principles in Indian law—ones that go beyond 
politically-correct lip-service. The Idea of Justice‘s treatment of freedom, autonomy, and 
fairness, illuminate how similar ideas of tribal self-determination and land liberation fit into 
global demands for justice. 
Sen‘s first major critique of Rawls is the assumption that just institutions necessarily 
produce just conduct. In very simple terms, Sen makes a pragmatism argument, claiming that 
procedural justice—the mere existence of fairly constructed institutions—cannot govern people‘s 
actual behavior, particularly as human behavior is often inconsistent with collective values and 
norms.
56
 The belief that ―just‖ institutions should rely on actual behaviors, as opposed to 
theoretical behaviors, is vital because a whole system of justice requires the accommodation of a 
variety of complex, socio-political and inter-personal factors.
57
  Sen essentially adopts a Legal 
                                                          
56
 Sen raises two objections under his ―relevance of actual behaviors‖ critique. In addition to his pragmatic 
argument, he is also skeptical that social ―realizations‖ are accounted for in Rawls‘ consensus model. This argument 
is a classic consequentialist objection which claims that proceduralism cannot account for unpredictable 
consequences. I chose to focus on the narrower pragmatist objection because it is more closely related to the article‘s 
discussion to human freedom and normative law.  
 
57
 THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 67-68.  
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Realist position, in which ―the centrality of human lives in reasoned assessments of the world in 
which we live‖ is paramount.58 He argues that a whole system of justice must center real 
experiences as its primary object of consideration because it is analogous to building a pond 
without bearing in mind its fish. Sen‘s re-orientation reflects a modern theoretical shift away 
from abstract transcendental analysis to concrete, people-centered problem-solving, especially 
around issues involving acute human suffering.
59
 
A Realist perspective is valuable when examining land justice in American Indian law. 
Generally speaking, Indian law jurisprudence consistently disfavors original Indian land claims, 
even during the present ―self-determination period.‖60 Throughout American history, courts have 
upheld unsavory treaty deals and defended malicious congressional action against tribes due, in 
part, to a belief that reasonable legal formalities ensure just results.
61
 In broad strokes, non-
Indian immoral behavior was ignored, tolerated, and sometimes extolled by courts, based on a 
disingenuous presumption that ―fair‖ judicially-made legal principles would not produce unjust 
outcomes or that democratically-elected governmental branches would not enact unfair laws.
62
 
                                                          
58
 Id. at 225.  
 
59
 Sen is an outspoken advocate against poverty because he believes that it literally and metaphysically deprives 
people from experiencing the full value of freedom. See Normative Evaluation and Legal Analogue, supra note 18, 
at 250 (arguing that poverty is the deprivation of the most basic human capabilities).  
 
60
 I should emphasize here that Indian law jurisprudence is not designed to collectively benefit American Indians. It 
is, in actuality, related to Indian histories, in terms of the Anglo enterprise to control Indians. See. Robert A. 
Williams Jr., “The People of the States Where They Are Found Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies”: The Indian 
Side of the Story of Indian Rights and Federalism, 38 ARIZ. L. R. 981, 986-987 (1996) (arguing that Anglo law has 
shaped Indian history in a way that explains today‘s legal and real context).  
 
61
 The Cherokee Nation Treaty of New Echota exemplifies coercive U.S. government treaty-making tactics. See 
Ezra Rosser, The Nature of Representation: The Cherokee Right to a Congressional Delegate, 15 B. U. PUB. INT. L. 
J. 91, 92 (2005) (recounting that Congress allowed a minority-supported, white sympathetic Nation representative to 
dubiously replace the majority-supported, fervent Nation delegate during the treaty-making process, which preceded 
the infamous Trail of Tears). 
 
62
 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903) (illustrating an extreme ―good faith‖ trust principle 
application in this landmark case that declared that the court must presume perfect congressional faith in Indian 
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As Sen explains in reference to the protection of minority rights under a modern justice theory, 
―there is no chance of resting the matter of ‗safe‘ hands of purely institutional virtuosity,‖ based 
on the reality that empirical accounts do not justify such ambivalence.  
Moreover, contemporary scholars have debunked the pretense that American Indian law 
or its arbiters primarily sought to help American Indians.
63
 Quasi-sovereignty is an example of a 
failed legal doctrine, which while originally fashioned to recognize limited tribal self-
determination, has been judicially diminished over the years, amounting to an incredibly 
bureaucratic governance structure that curtails tribal self-determination. 
64
 Neo-liberalism‘s 
promise to expand freedoms through democracy and other open processes continues to fall short, 
particularly in the American Indian context. Sen‘s critique of Rawlsian transcendentalism is 
really a broader criticism of the modern liberal state‘s failure to ensure justice which American 
Indian legal principles are a poignant example.  
This observation about the modern liberal state reveals a much deeper point, however. 
Institutional failures to actualize justice demonstrate the relevance and power of choice. 
Individuals‘ choices, and social choices made within institutions, shape more than principles of 
justice. These choices also shape the operation of justice. Social choice is not distilled by a pure 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
affairs despite any contrary, factual evidence showing that Congress exercised its plenary power against tribal 
wishes to administer the federal allotment policy). See also Lincoln Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads: Reconciling 
Native Sovereignty and the Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290, 310 (2009)(commenting that the Lone Wolf decision 
altered the federal trust doctrine from an arguably protective relationship to a power-based relationship with its 
implication that Congress possesses absolute plenary power to which the courts should show extremely high 
deference).  
 
63
 See Robert Williams, Jr., supra note 60, at 985 (1996) (―[S]o the familiar story goes, [White Man‘s Indian Laws] 
were developed here by the courts and policy-making institutions established by the dominant white European-
derived society into a redemptive force for perpetuating American Indian tribalism‘s survival . . . is a classic 
illustration of what‘s completely wrong with most Federal Indian Law scholarship‖).   
 
64
 See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON 170 – 173 (arguing that the cultural imperialist basis 
upon which Indian legal principles were founded allow the Supreme Court to incrementally undermine the 
―measured separatism‖ sought by tribes to exercise minimal self-determination).     
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political process whether it is Rawls‘ original position or otherwise because as a contract-based 
consensus may be reached on one end, individuals‘ choices will surely affect social choices 
which appear on the other. Therefore, any serious critique of transcendental justice must deal 
with people as choice-makers. Sen not only advocates for a theory of justice that centers people 
and their experiences but he further argues that freedom is elemental to actualize justice.
65
 
Meaningful choice, in his mind, lives in its fullness— from its scope to its quality. Social and 
individual prioritization of freedom is the standard by which to evaluate the meaningfulness of 
choice.  
Sen‘s second major critique deals with Rawls‘ use of social contract method. In Rawls‘ 
theory the way to reach consensus is through mutual agreement within the original position. The 
social contract method derives from the Enlightenment tradition, which analogizes the 
relationship between people and government as one of a legal contract whereby persons forfeit a 
degree of freedom in exchange for (limited) collective governance.
66
 The social contract model 
contrasts against philosopher Jeremy Bentham‘s utilitarian model. The utilitarian model, instead, 
reaches majoritarian agreement through a maximum utility calculation.
67
 Sen argues that Rawls‘ 
                                                          
65
 See Amartya Sen, Justice Means Freedom, PHIL. & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, Spring 1990 at 113-114 (―Given n different 
types of functionings, an ‗n-tuple‘ of functionings represents the focal features of a person's living, with each of its n 
components reflecting the extent of the achieve- ment of a particular functioning. A person's ‗capability‘ is 
represented by the set of n-tuples of functionings from which the person can choose any one n-tuple. The ‗capability 
set‘ thus stands for the actual freedom of choice a person has over alternative lives that he or she can lead.‖) 
(citations omitted). 
 
66
 See Rawls, supra note 34, at 10 (explaining that his aim was to offer a theory of justice that brought social contract 
theories of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant to a higher level of abstraction); CHANDRAN KUKATHAS & PHILLIP PETTIT, 
RAWLS: A THEORY OF JUSTICE AND ITS CRITICS 17-35 (1990) (providing more details about the origins of Rawls‘ 
conception of the social contract method, including specific parameters around the original position and the veil of 
ignorance). 
 
67
 See P.J. KELLY, UTILITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE CIVIL LAW 69(1990) 
(explaining that Bentham‘s utilitarian distributive justice framework guided legislators to act consistent with the 
principle of utility and its maximization to ensure social well-being). 
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theory on this aspect is under-developed because it never explored alternative consensus methods 
other than utilitarianism.
68
 This narrow scope disabled Rawls from effusively critiquing the 
contract method and its relationship to social choice. 
Sen believes that there are at least four problems inherent within social contract method. 
Namely, Sen criticizes its structural exclusiveness and its presumption that persons make 
complete social assessments.
69
 Thus, in the Capability Theory, Sen replaces the social contract 
method with another device—Adam Smith‘s ―Impartial Spectator.‖ 70 The Impartial Spectator 
(I.S.) method suggests that a consensus model must seek perspectives that are ―‗a certain 
distance from us‘‖71 to form an objective legislative inquiry. I.S. is an observatory device that 
necessarily supplements the original position. Its purpose is to fill-in the closed social contract 
method gaps, especially within a sovereign nation context, so that decisions may consider extra-
territorial implications.
72
 I.S. advances the view that a watchful eye from distant stakeholders 
injects a level of accountability that is presently absent from Rawls‘ chosen method, and at least 
is minimally exclusive compared to other models  
Sen further contends that this method, unlike the social contract, embodies a more realist 
buoyancy against human irrationality (a tendency toward incomplete assessment) and avoids 
arbitrary exclusion. In other words, a degree of flexibility is necessary for a practicable system of 
justice to ensure fairness because people are as imperfect as their systems. I.S. particularly 
                                                          
68
 THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 70.  
 
69
 Id. 
 
70
 Id. at 124-152 (explaining three problems with closed consensus models, including its ambivalence toward 
relational justice, real implications on decisions on others, and risk for parochialism).  
 
71
 Id. at 45. 
 
72
 Id. at 124-125.  
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responds to Rawls‘ critics‘ fears that rigid, elite decision-making processes result in abuse. 
America‘s oppressed peoples‘ histories, including American Indian histories, warrant such fear.73  
Sen envisions a more objective set of watchers who are equipped with intervention 
powers. This concept is similar to Robert Williams‘ and James Anaya‘s choice of law appeals for 
international law application to American Indians and other indigenous peoples.
74
 Sen, as a long-
time human rights law advocate, supports strong accountability norms and mechanisms that do 
not predominantly rely on large centralized institutions. He has advanced a three-step analysis 
(recognition, agitation, and legislation)
75
 which aims to substantiate the notion of human rights 
beyond the institutional archetype. Based on his alternative vision, the I.S. method may strike a 
balance between closed, rigid decision-making processes and exclusive, concentrated 
institutional control.
 76
  
Land liberation, as a long-range vision toward American Indian justice, is a progressive 
idea that contains within it the American Indian collective memory of colonial conflict, 
institutional abuse, and majoritarian mistreatment, as well as cultural transmission, 
                                                          
73
  See Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, supra note 33, at 202 (―American Indian history has been portrayed by 
most scholars as a defensive response to European colonization (the ‗reservation period,‘ ‗removal era‘ etc ...), 
leading to a rather linear appraisal of tribal sovereignty. Thus, tribal sovereignty becomes an account of what tribes 
once had, how they lost that, and how they are striving to succeed living in a different world than that of their 
Ancestors.) (citations omitted).  
 
74
 Robert Williams Jr., Encounters On the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L. J. 660, 663-664 (1990) (arguing that contemporary 
international law provides a stage from which oppressed indigenous people can demand rights and share their 
narratives as a means of their collective survival).  
 
75
 See Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS (Fall 2004) at 315, 342-345.  
 
76
 This vision is very much like the existing international law model but with important changes. See James Anaya, 
infra note 262.  
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organizational cooperation, and political resistance.
77
 Tribes continue to struggle against land 
divestment, despite neo-liberalism‘s worn-out promise for justice. Western democracy must 
renew its commitment to justice against an oppressive historical backdrop. The Capability 
Theory, consisting of a behavior-centered framework and open accountability device, improve 
upon Rawls‘ arguably misplaced hope for a just neoliberal society. 
The Capability Theory and Its Relationship to Land Liberation  
The Capability Theory diverges from the two prominent schools of thought in political 
philosophy—Bentham‘s utilitarianism and Rawls‘ transcendentalism—by attributing personal 
advantage not to happiness or income but to real opportunity.
 78
 Thus, a just society is judged by 
its distribution of freedom to persons as opposed to its allocation of wealth or pleasure.
79
 
Meaningful freedom, in this sense, is the ability for a person to do what they value.
80
 This 
perspective is distinct from other justice theories‘ informational foci that emphasize human 
continuity (tendency to wholly define happiness in one way or to possess the same set of needs) 
over human dynamism (tendency to possess pluralistic desires and hold conflicting values).
81
 
The strength of this perspective, Sen suggests, is that its freedom cherishes a core value for the 
                                                          
77
 Writers must be careful not to suggest that all of U.S.-American Indian is negative. It is a complex history which 
consists of a mostly poor record. See VINE DELORIA, JR., & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN 
JUSTICE xi (1983) (describing a complex American Indian history in which tribes were forced to retain the better 
parts of old culture while adjusting to new realities posed by European overtures and intrusions). 
 
78
 The IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 231.  
 
79
 Id. at 228 (describing that freedom contains two distinct values, including an opportunity aspect, which involves 
the freedom to pursue a particular activity notwithstanding the outcome—the quality of choice, and a process aspect, 
which involves way in which we make free choices—the freedom of execution). The opportunity aspect is the most 
relevant part to the land liberation analysis, however, the process aspect, which is accentuated in Rawls‘ theory of 
justice, remains important, though, not as vital for the purposes of the article.  
 
80
 Id. at 231-232.  
 
81
 Id. at 233 (explaining that a plurality of different features affect our lives and affect our moral choices). 
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quality of life rather than the mere, auxiliary means that may sustain life, such as wealth or 
pleasure.
82
 The Capability Theory elevates a value of high moral relevance today—freedom—as 
the primary assessment threshold for a just society. Better yet, it affirms human dynamism as a 
core value, which also forms the foundation for the land liberation vision. 
Importantly, the Capability Theory is not an individualist justice framework. It accounts 
for individual existence within communities and other social phenomenon by explaining that 
people‘s ability to do what they value is subject to social influence.83 Sen recognizes that it is, in 
fact, impossible to detach the individual from the world within she or he lives. Capability Theory 
affirms that communities play an important role in shaping people‘s totality from their values to 
their beliefs about their own ability.
84
 Pluralism is a main principle of Capability Theory that can 
be applied to the land liberation vision as well.  
The Capability Theory offers a way from which to resolve the dialectic interplay between 
representatives‘ (tribes and trust guardians) and individuals‘ competing interests within the land 
liberation vision. American Indians are not a monolith nor are tribes perfect proxies for 
individual tribe members.
85
 When representatives‘ and individuals‘ interests clash, tension may 
be eased by a Capability Theory freedom-of-opportunity analysis, which examines the potential 
limitations on actual opportunity to one interest-holder or the other. An ideal choice would 
accommodate multiple stakeholders‘ freedom interests. Most significantly, a Capability 
theoretical analysis opens up possibilities for fair resolutions based on actual happenings, unlike 
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 Id. at 233-34 (stressing that actual opportunity is freedom‘s core in a philosophical and practical sense). 
 
83
 Id. at 244 (countering the methodological individualism critiques of the Capability Theory which argue that it 
simply promotes free individual decision-making rather than collective justice-building). 
 
84
 Id. at 246 (emphasizing that the denial of a person‘s multiple and complex identities and memberships has the 
paradoxical effect of denying persons the freedom to be themselves).  
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utilitarian or transcendental models. When applied to the land libration vision, Capability Theory 
supports tribal land restoration, but may not require non-Indian forced relocation or other 
seemingly unfair outcomes, either. A freedom-centered model, though intricate, more directly 
leads to fair restorative justice solutions than the other prevailing models. 
The Capability Theory also encompasses three other relevant values to the land liberation 
vision: non-exploitation, non-discrimination, and complex need. Sen persuasively argues that 
none of these values are fully secured within utilitarianism and resource-transcendentalism 
because the provision of happiness or primary goods do not necessarily satisfy human desire to 
be free from harm or deprivation.
86
 Need, in contrast, is an affirmative act, which is often deep 
and multi-faceted. Justice theories for which exploitation, discrimination, and complex need are 
not addressed seem to undermine the demands of twenty-first century justice.  
A close analysis reveals this point. Exploitation and discrimination are values that may 
co-exist with happiness and wealth. A person, for example, may feel happiness from being 
significantly compensated for use of her land, but may be a victim of commercial exploitation, in 
which a company may under-compensate her for the land use. Although utilitarian and 
transcendentalism defenders may point out that she is happy and compensated, therefore, under-
compensation is immaterial, it is indeed important because the company unfairly took advantage 
of the land-owner to its benefit, and worse, should the predatory behavior continue, the 
community is at-risk for further harm. Its aggregate impact implicates a broader concern that 
invokes feelings about injustice.  
                                                          
86
 Sen, supra note 18, at 327-328 (describing a comparative hypothetical involving a physically-disabled man in 
which the man is not helped by utilitarian model because it would give him less money than physically fit person 
and likewise, he is not helped by resource-transcendental model (Rawls‘ model) because although he would be 
given more money, the institution is disinterested in his severe disability; the capability model addresses the man‘s 
true needs by offering him sufficient income and accommodations for his disability, if necessary).   
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 Perhaps most unsettling is that the law may not be a justice-serving tool in this scenario 
within an Indian law context. An actual example that is similar to the previous hypothetical is 
illustrative. In United States v. Navajo Nation
87
 the Supreme Court held against the Nation‘s 
claim that the Secretary of Interior abrogated its fiduciary trust duty in its approval of a coal 
lease amendment when the Secretary delayed contractual review, and placed the Nation in a 
near-impossible negotiation position with Peabody Coal Company. Navajo Nation specifically 
claimed that the Secretary failed to make a timely royalty rate recommendation, in which the 
delay occurred after the Secretary had an ex-parte meeting with the coal company. 
88
 The 
majority ruled against the undue influence claim on technical grounds, arguing that ex-parte 
meetings were not statutorily barred, and therefore, permissible. 
89
  
The dissent, however, accurately isolated and portrayed the real issue—undue influence. 
Once the Secretary secretly met with the coal company and misled the Nation into believing that 
an adjustment decision was not imminent, the Nation was forced into a weak bargaining position. 
The Nation, therefore, had little choice but to accept the lower royalty rate.
90
 Navajo Nation‘s 
outcome underscores the reality that exploitation occurs despite legal intervention, and in this 
case, legal intervention facilitated exploitation. Sadly, federal government trust abrogation is not 
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 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
 
88
 Id. at 512.  
 
89
 Id. at 512-514.  
 
90
 Id. at 520 (―The purpose and predictable effect of these actions was to induce the Tribe to take a deep discount in 
the royalty rate in the face of what the Tribe feared would otherwise be prolonged revenue loss and uncertainty. The 
point of this evidence is not that the Secretary violated some rule of procedure for administrative appeals, or some 
statutory duty regarding royalty adjustments under the terms of the earlier lease. What these facts support is the 
Tribe's claim that the Secretary defaulted on his fiduciary responsibility to withhold approval of an inadequate lease 
accepted by the Tribe while under a disadvantage the Secretary himself had intentionally imposed.‖)(citations 
omitted).  
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uncommon,
91
 and as a result, tribes continue to suffer from institutional failures that primarily 
benefit non-tribal members.  
Equally important is that the utilitarian and resource-transcendental models do not 
address complex needs other than happiness or income. Neither theory evaluates conditions 
surrounding persons‘ respective needs. Instead they merely evaluate and prioritize the needs 
themselves.
92
 Need is complex in a way that the mere possession of tangible goods is not always 
satisfactory. Also, for example, when needs become urgent from long-time deprivation or abuse, 
then a whole justice system must contain time-sensitive and adequate responsiveness. This is a 
significant blind-spot for the prevailing models. Historically, political justice theories have 
simply equated justice with basic needs being met one way or another without regard to the way 
in which needs are met.
93
 When utilitarian and transcendental models fail to respond to critical 
needs, it harms real people and demoralizes the collective pursuit for justice.
94
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 See generally Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice’s Conflict of Interest in Representing 
Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307 (2002-2003) (arguing that the Department of Justice holds an inherent 
conflict of interest in challenging government trusteeship violations); Raymond Cross, The Federal Trust Duty in an 
Age of Indian Self-Determination: An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 369, 386-387 (2003) 
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interests with tribal interests within the context of another recent canonical case, Nevada v. Hicks); Rebecca Tsosie, 
The Conflict Between the “Public Trust” and the “Indian Trust” Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native 
Nations, 39 TULSA L. REV. 271 (2003) (arguing that Indian ancestral interests are often marginalized in public trust 
land considerations).  
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 IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 251.  
 
93
 See Amaryta Sen, supra note 65, at 327 (arguing that the two ―welfarist‖ equality theories, utilitarianism and 
transcendentalism, fail to provide an adequate informational focus even when both approaches are combined). 
 
94
 See, e.g., Edward Sifuentes, Tribal leaders rip Census Bureau officials, NORTH COUNTY TIMES (May 9, 2010) 
available at http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/sdcounty/article_1698cfa7-dadc-547e-b366-703c4f440c71.html 
(reporting that San Diego County tribal leaders, the County with the largest number of federally-recognized tribes, 
sent a joint letter to the Census Bureau describing a breakdown in cooperation with assigned liaisons, which could 
mean the difference of millions of dollars in federal aid).  
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Overall, it seems as though the Capability Theory better balances widely cherished 
values—lack of deprivation (need), happiness, material security, non-exploitation and non-
discrimination. Its capacity and freedom nexus intrinsically ties each of these values together 
rather than puts them in competition with one another because each value is an equal part of the 
justice formula. The Capability Theory also better responds to modern state discrimination, 
exploitation, and abuse, which tend to live in the gap between institutional duty and delivery. 
The denial of justice in the modern neo-liberal state systemically occurs through limitations to 
access or opportunity, as well as divestment, coercion, and other abuses of power. Sen‘s vision 
reiterates that the imperative of a twenty-first century theory of justice is to identify and respond 
to subtleties in our existing laws, administering institutions, and norm that manifest unfairness, 
exclusion, and deprivation.  
 This vision closely aligns to one long-held by American Indian advocates for land 
liberation.  Part III further explores the land liberation vision with this theoretical backdrop, and 
evaluates its implications and possibilities for American Indian land justice in the not-so-distant 
future.     
 
III. Liberating Land and Life: A Closer Look at the Land Liberation Vision and Its 
Implications  
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Land liberation is a prophetic aspiration for many American Indian people, which 
conjures hope and uncertainty. It symbolizes a reunion with their cultural wholeness and a form 
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 GEORGE E. ―TINK‖ TINKER, AMERICAN INDIAN LIBERATION: A THEOLOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY 17 (2008) (translated 
from Osage to English as ―Grandmother! Grandfather! Sacred One Above and Sacred One Below. Thank you for 
this day, for life itself, and especially for this gathering of relatives in the struggle for liberation‖).  
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of spiritual renewal.
96
 Land restoration is the legal element for a moral realization, yet land 
restoration bears little moral significance without its liberation from colonial control. Thus, 
Robert Porter‘s land liberation vision is a richly powerful idea that contains layered meanings 
and opportunities during the human rights revolution.  
American Indian law is a significant barrier that stands between the ―current state of 
things‖ and land liberation.97  Land ownership and access between Indians and non-Indians 
continues to be the legal site of conflict since colonization.
98
 Land restoration, therefore, 
implicates basic American Indian legal principles, and presents the potential to transform these 
basic, though arguably very harmful principles, such as quasi-sovereignty, plenary congressional 
power, and the trust doctrine. Land liberation, which is one step beyond land restoration, is a 
policy proposal that builds a transitory bridge in the tribal-United States relationship from 
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 Id. at 9 (noting that among four major Euro-Indian cultural differences is Indian ―filial attachment‖ to particular 
places which fosters cultural and spiritual values of responsibility, communitarianism, and inter-relatedness).  
 
97
 See CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 55-87 (1987) (detailing that tribes retained some level of sovereignty after contact 
but that this sovereignty was gradually eroded by court decisions through the twentieth century); Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 121, 122-125 (2006) (arguing that 
Congress and the Executive have adopted a reactionary approach to policy-making, which has left Indians and the 
judiciary to answer pressing policy questions, however, the judiciary is usurping more and more policy-making 
power that is dangerous to Indians and their sovereignty). The other primary barrier, of course, is non-Indian 
political reluctance to restore original Indian title.   
 
98
 See Singel & Fletcher, supra note 26, at 21 (―Indian land claims have long been a foundational and fundamental 
subject of American law.‖); VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE 
OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 12 (1984) (―It is important to understand the primacy of land in the Indian 
psychological makeup, because, as land is alienated, all other forms of social cohesion also begin to erode, land 
having been the context in which the other forms have been created.‖); Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican 
Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-Envisioned, 
Reinvigorated, and Re-Empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 487 (2005) (noting that land-less tribes find it much 
more difficult to establish sovereignty).  
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imperialist-imposition to sovereign co-existence.
99
 Land liberation, as a vision, expresses a long-
time Indian demand for enduring peace, political integrity, and cultural respect.  
The land liberation vision contains at least three meanings. One meaning is land 
restoration—reinstating original land claims and access that many American Indian tribes and 
tribal members lost. Another meaning is justice—making amends for the ways in which tribes 
and tribal members lost land through unsavory land deals, federal government divestment 
policies, and violent force.
100
 A third meaning is political emancipation
101— reserving tribes and 
tribal members full ability to use and govern land in a way that honors their needs and desires.
102
 
The freedom to choose is at the heart of the land liberation vision and at the theoretical core of 
tribal sovereignty.  
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 See Robert Clinton, Comity and Colonialism: The Federal Courts’ Frustration of Tribal-Federal Cooperation, 36 
ARIZ. ST. L. J. (2004) (explaining that the current American Indian law regime is designed to prevent federal-tribal 
cooperation which is counter-intuitive to the reality that sovereign neighbors often have mutual interests upon which 
to have a cooperative relationship).  
 
100
 See WARD CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS, 1492 to 
the Present (1997) (providing a general picture of colonial violence against Indians in the Americas). 
 
101
 Indian affirmative action challenges have been struck down in a line of cases that affirm that Indians are properly 
classified as political members of quasi-sovereign nations rather than a distinct race-based group. See Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (holding that Bureau of Indian Affairs employment preference did not constitute invidious 
discrimination because Indians constitute a unique political group subject to rational basis review, and that Indian 
tribes as political sovereigns maintain the right to further self-government); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 
645 (1977)(holding against petitioners‘ equal protection claims based on opinion that federal legislation related to 
Indians is not race-based but instead it is ―legislation expressly provided for in the Constitution and supported by the 
ensuing history of the Federal Government‘s relations with Indians.‖) Some scholars affirm these cases by arguing 
that Indians are better described as cultural-political minorities rather than racial minorities under the existing legal 
regime although there is clear indication that courts have held culturally bigoted and racist views of Indians. See 
generally Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not “Strictly” Racial: A Response to “Indians As Peoples,” 39 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 169 (arguing against David Williams‘ claim that Indians enjoyed special exceptions under the law because they 
are inappropriately categorized as political minorities out of reach of racial equal protection scrutiny). See also Ex 
Parte Kan-gi-Shun-Ca (otherwise known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883) (holding that tribes as ―distinct 
political bodies‖ retain sovereignty to enforce criminal laws onto its own citizens). But see id. at 571 (characterizing 
―civilized‖ White Man‘s laws as demonstrative of racial superiority). See also Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial 
Equality: Old and New Strains and American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333 (2004) (arguing that American 
Indian tribes should be seen as racial, cultural and political minorities who exist as separate legal sovereigns). 
 
102
 See Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 
OR. L. REV. 1109, 1190-1199 (2004) (acknowledging that sovereignty may mean the choice to more closely align 
with the United States government). 
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Connecting Theoretical Principles of the Capability Theory and Land Liberation  
Globalization has fundamentally changed the international political landscape.
103
 Politics 
are no longer contained within a nation-state or within a geographical region—they spill all over 
the world map. Political communities have emerged across, through, and in-between national 
boundaries as justice demands from clean water to adequate housing are on the rise.
104
 These 
political communities march under the broad human rights‘ banner and they have become a 
mounting force that credits its growth to two sides of globalization, one side that facilitates 
distant relationship-building and another side that creates similar political and economic 
pressures against which communities struggle.
 105
  
Economist, Amartya Sen, is a child of the human rights movement, and significantly 
contributed to its development into a full-fledged political and legal revolution over the last thirty 
years.
106
 ―Human rights‖ as we know it today, however, could not exist without the failed 
European colonialist enterprise. Its remnants, along with the human rights movement‘s 
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 See Noam Chomsky, supra note 47.  
 
104
 See Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a Human Right and the Duties 
and Obligations It Creates, 4 NW. U. J. INT‘L HUM. RTS. 331 (2005) (arguing that the necessity of water and 
growing scarcity should establish it as a fundamental human right under international law); Padraic Kenna, 
Globalization and housing rights, 15 IND. J. GLO. L. S. 397 (2008) (calling for a shift from a neo-liberal housing-as-
property regimes to a positive housing rights model). 
 
105
 See GLOBALIZATION AND THE CONNECTION OF REMOTE COMMUNITIES: ENVIRONMENTAL, ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL IMPACTS PROJECT, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION & MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.globalchange.msu.edu/nicaragua/overview.html (last visited May 11, 2010); NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO 
(2002) (explaining the rise of corporate power and its grip on branding, identity, and original thought).  
 
106
 See POLLY VIZARD, CENTRE FOR ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION, THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PROFESSOR 
AMARTYA SEN IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2005) available at 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/CASEpaper91.pdf.   
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ascendancy, formed the conditions for the international indigenous movement and its demand for 
collective rights.
107
 
Post-imperialism justice, whether human rights or indigenous rights, takes on a certain 
resemblance from struggle to struggle in this century. Human rights-seekers and imperialist 
resistors have encountered tension in their justice pursuits, yet, they have, in large part, helped 
inform each other about their mutual struggles.
108
 This background explains the implicit 
connection between Amartya Sen‘s human rights‘ justice vision and Robert Odawi Porter‘s 
American Indian justice vision.
109
 Behind these visions is the belief that the hard, complex 
realities lived by their local and world communities can be transformed—they simply need the 
access and freedom to realize their own communal power and balance. 
Sen‘s and Porter‘s justice visions mutually reinforce each other through four shared 
values: dynamism, pluralism, flexibility, and responsiveness. These four values, missing from 
modern neo-liberal justice, are engendered in the land liberation vision. Dynamism and 
pluralism, for example, are exhibited by sovereign tribal nations themselves in their divergent 
and evolving needs, governance, and heritages.
110
 Yet federal Indian law, in contrast, is 
exceptionally slow to change. The conservative, United States‘ common law system, 
commitment to dual federalism, and judges‘ unfamiliarity with American Indian tribes and law, 
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See S. James Anaya, infra note 262 and accompanying text.  
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 See S. James Anaya, supra note 17.  
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 There will be several Capability Theory elements discussed in the previously section, which I will not describe 
in-depth in the land liberation section, including the Impartial Spectator method and international law comparative 
analysis. This comparison will be re-visited in Part IV.  
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 There are 564 federally-recognized tribes and 74 state-recognized tribes as of March 2009. See National Council 
of State Legislatures, ―Federal and State Recognized Tribes,‖ http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13278#state (last visited 
April 26, 2010). 
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instills rigidity into American Indian law that disfavors tribal self-determination.
111
 Accordingly, 
Indian law does not facilitate responsiveness to tribal and tribal members‘ needs as much as it 
facilitates Indian control. A newly-established United States and tribal nations‘ relationship must 
work toward a practical kind of peace that allows tribes and tribal members to effectively 
respond to their needs.    
Sen‘s Idea of Justice, in turns, extracts these four important values from modern neo-
liberalism‘s remains. His proposed Capability Theory emphasizes the natural dynamism that 
exists in our human behavior; the necessity for justice to operate within a plural environment, 
among persons, and communities; the importance of flexibility to evaluate plural interests
112
; and 
most significant, responsiveness to actual events to account for harms, such as non-
discrimination, non-exploitation, and extreme inequality.    
With radical change, however, comes challenging transition. Given human rights‘ 
purpose to redistribute power and resources, and land liberation‘s purpose to establish full tribal 
emancipation, questions emerge as to how the law will facilitate or impede progress; which 
political barriers must be overcome to realize the visions; and how best to anticipate practical 
                                                          
111
 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The 
Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court refuses to 
recognize tribes as a third-sovereign because it imbalances the United States‘ firmly-held dual-sovereign system); 
Tonya Kowalski, The Forgotten Sovereigns, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 765 (stating that most of the legal community 
overlooks tribal sovereigns within a federalist government context); Vine Deloria Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and 
Humanity: Reflections on the Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 203-205 
(explaining that the void of knowledge about tribes, tribal histories, and specific-Indian law principles, in part, has 
created a patchwork body of law, which is consistently misunderstood by courts and even each generation of Indian 
law scholars who accept popular narratives as true despite evidence to the contrary). 
 
112
 As discussed in the previous section, Sen argues that each person contains multiple and often conflicting 
interests. See Amartya Sen, supra note 1, at 233. Some Indian advocates, in recent years, have argued that tribes, in 
addition to their single tribal identities, should assume Pan-Indian identities. JOANNE NAGEL, AMERICAN INDIAN 
ETHNIC RENEWAL: RED POWER AND THE RESURGENCE OF IDENTITY AND CULTURE 9 (1996) (arguing that despite 
tribal diversity, many tribes have undertaken similar patterns of ―ethnic resurgence‖); DONALD L. FIXICO, THE 
URBAN INDIAN EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 123-140 (2000) (noting the rise in Pan-Indianism, analogized to kinship or 
community emphases in many tribal traditions, is on the rise as increasing numbers of Indians leave their 
reservations).    
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challenges along the way. The Idea of Justice will guide this analysis into land liberation‘s 
theoretical meaning for American Indian justice, separation, and sovereignty, regarding two 
specific problems: the ―plenary power‖ problem and ―loss of trust‖ problem.  
The Plenary Power Problem 
The first challenge is the plenary power doctrine. The plenary power doctrine is a 
judicially-created principle that grants Congress exclusive authority over Indian affairs as a 
condition of post-contact ―discovery.‖113  The doctrine has evolved over time to establish a 
federal government-tribe ―guardian-ward‖ relationship,114 to restore certain sovereign powers 
back to tribes,
115
 to cede jurisdictional power to states,
116
 and most significantly, to allow 
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 See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379-380 (―The territorial governments owe all their powers to the statutes of the United 
States conferring on them the powers which they exercise, and which are liable to be withdrawn, modified, or 
repealed at any time by congress. What authority the state governments may have to enact criminal laws for the 
Indians will be presently considered. But this power of congress to organize territorial governments, and make laws 
for their inhabitants, arises, not so much from the clause in the constitution in regard to disposing of and making 
rules and regulations concerning the territory and other property of the United States, as from the ownership of the 
country in which the territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the national 
government, and can be found nowhere else.‖); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding that Congress 
possessed constitutional power to lift or relax tribes‘ criminal jurisdiction per its ―plenary and exclusive‖ powers 
under the Indian Commerce and Treaty Clauses). See also, Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope 
and Limitations, supra note 26; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, supra note 97, at 163-164 (1996) (noting that although it is 
known as the congressional plenary power doctrine, some scholars have argue that it in reality ―judicial plenary 
power‖ reins over the United States-tribe relationship because there is so little constitutional and legislative guidance 
that courts have largely dictated Indian policy as well as Indian law).   
 
114
 The original trust doctrine established a guardian-ward relationship. See Worcester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 
Pet.) 515 (1832). See also United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913) (expressly re-affirming the guardian-
ward relationship by claiming that Pueblos were regarded and treated like ―other Indian communities‖ which 
required ―special consideration and protection‖).  
 
115
 Congress has established landmark legislation to reverse explicitly anti-Indian policies and to restore minimal 
tribal sovereignty. See Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, as amended at 
25 U.S.C. §§ 461 – 79 (1970) (permitting tribes to adopt appropriate constitutions to re-gain certain sovereign 
powers and granting eligibility for economic development funding). See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 
313, 329 (1978) (rejecting contention that tribes derive power from the federal government but retain their powers as 
independent sovereigns). 
 
116
 See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that tribes lacked regulatory authority over state officers 
investigating alleged off-reservation crimes); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that tribes 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over personal injury claims that occurred on highway running through 
reservation); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (holding 
that state cigarette tax may be imposed on reservation distributors); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 
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Congress to govern internal tribal affairs.
117
 Tribes, however, have not regained their full pre-
constitutional sovereignty under the doctrine‘s expansive policy scheme. The plenary power 
doctrine poses a legal barrier for the land liberation vision for the reason that the United States 
federal government and tribes cannot functionally reserve concurrent sovereignty. Tribal 
sovereignty divestment is a political vestige that can be addressed with restorative policies.  
There are three frameworks from which to address the plenary power problem: full pre-
constitutional restoration, remedial judicial restoration, and non-judicial restoration. Each of 
these frameworks may lead to a more pro-sovereignty solution than the present, yet each one 
possesses varying ―ebbs‖ of sovereign Indian power. Land liberation, as a vision similar to Sen‘s 
Capability Theory, strives for the highest ebb of broadly-defined tribal sovereign power. The 
question then becomes this: is there a way to reach the ―highest ebb‖ through the existing legal 
regime?  
Full Pre-Constitutional Restoration 
The first framework is full pre-constitutional restoration. Full pre-constitutional 
sovereignty existed when American Indians tribes lived as independent peoples ‗by nature and 
necessity‘ prior to European contact, and whereby ―tribes managed their own affairs without 
outside source legitimization of their governance.‖118 Full pre-constitutional sovereignty trumps 
the Marshall Trilogy so to speak, the early landmark Indian law cases that shrewdly asserted 
federal sovereignty over tribes. The Marshall Trilogy authoritatively diminished full pre-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
191 (1978) (holding that tribes do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commits on-
reservation crimes).   
 
117
 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that tribal sovereignty does not extend to criminal sanctions 
against non-member Indians). This decision was later overturned by 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4). 
 
118
 See Tweedy, supra note 49, at 654 (explaining in the Supreme Court‘s view that the establishment of the United 
States legitimately divested inherent tribal sovereignty). 
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constitutional sovereignty under United States federal law.
119
 These foundational cases 
legitimized the application of Anglo-colonizer law to tribes
120
 and remain the source of much 
scholarly discussion regarding Justice Marshall‘s political compromise and its impact on modern 
American Indian law today.
121
 Yet there is legal consensus among Indian law scholars that these 
cases limited tribes‘ inherent sovereign power in the eyes of the United States‘ federal 
government.
122
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 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 
120
 I undoubtedly fall into the ―critical‖ camp who views colonial power to exercise legal authority over another 
sovereign as inherently suspect. See Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case At A Time: Judicial Minimalism 
and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1192-1193 (2001) (observing that there are at least three doctrinal 
camps when examining the Marshall Trilogy—foundationalists, pragmatists, and critics—but noting that there is 
consensus that tribes retain inherent sovereign authority). But see Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: 
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993) (arguing 
that Marshall‘s ―foundational approach‖ effectively balanced colonialism and constitutionalism between dual 
sovereigns). See also Patrice H. Kunesh, Constant Governments: Tribal Resilience and Regeneration in Changing 
Times, 19 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 8, 9 (2009) (explaining that Marshall‘s foundational ―sovereignty‖ principles 
represent a vacillation of contradictory quasi-sovereign policies). I agree with Kunesh‘s analysis that the correct 
literal reading of the Marshall Trilogy is of one that nominally preserved pre-constitutional powers. A broad reading 
is necessary to contextualize the decisions, however. See Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A 
Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77 (1993) (―[D]istancing of the temporal and 
moral aspects of the issue represents a social avoidance mechanism by which non-Indian American society has 
marginalized questions relating to the fallout of colonization of America‘s aboriginal peoples.‖). The thrust of my 
point is to the extent that the Marshall Trilogy has established foundational principles, as long as the Supreme Court 
strays from those principles, and hence, from full pre-constitutional sovereignty, political emancipation grows an 
ever-distant reality.  
 
121
 See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N. D. L. REV. 627, 648-661 (2006) 
(arguing that the Marshall Trilogy‘s importance resides not in its precedential value but in its ―origin story‖ that give 
rise to major Indian law doctrines, including plenary power and the trust doctrines); Jen Camden & Kathryn E. Fort, 
“Channeling Thought”: The Legacy of Legal Fictions from 1823, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2009)(using the 
literary and critical race theory of ―legal fictions‖ to explain how false narratives within the Marshall Trilogy live on 
today).   
 
122
 The Marshall Trilogy cases divested tribal sovereigns of two powers: tribes‘ right to alienate land except to the 
United States federal government through the doctrine of discovery (McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 543) and tribes‘ 
right to engage with foreign nations (Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1).  A later case, Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191, 
divested tribes from exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-members. The reversal of the long-time inherent 
sovereignty doctrine, emerging in a line of recent cases beginning with Oliphant, is known as implicit divesture. See 
John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divesture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen’s Handbook Cutting Room Floor, 38 
CONN. L. REV. 731 (2005) (observing that these cases have divested tribes of originally preserved civil and 
adjudicatory powers).  
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The full pre-constitutional sovereignty framework‘s goal is to re-establish co-extensive 
sovereignty among the United States and tribal Nation, restoring tribes to the ―highest ebb‖ of its 
sovereign power. To do so the Marshall Trilogy must be examined anew.
123
 Its legal and 
historical impact is analogous to the infamous Dred Scott decision,
 124
  which upheld Black 
Americans‘ diminished legal personhood until it was overturned years later by the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.
125
 Though the analogy is imperfect—Black Americans were 
never part of independent political Nations—it is consistent with the comparison that Anglo-law 
was imposed onto free persons for the purposes of legal de-humanization and control. Likewise, 
as the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment signaled an outgrowth of changed political 
thinking,
 126
 the Marshall Trilogy and its doctrinal derivatives are not sacred doctrines.
127
   
There is an alternative view to the belief that the United States‘ founding legitimized 
colonial reign. Others who have countered the Marshall rationale argue that the Constitution‘s 
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 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 579, 580 (arguing that the 
Supreme Court does not hear Indian law cases to dis-entangle Indian issues but hears these cases to examine broader 
constitutional issues, which suggests that Indian law is a ―vessel‖ to constitutional jurisprudence that is not centered 
on establishing justice for Indians). 
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 See Nathan Goetting, The Marshall Trilogy and the Constitutional Dehumanization of American Indians, 65 
Guild Pract. 207, 207-210 (2008) (putting the Marshall Trilogy into a ―bad law‖ context that is analogous to other 
politically-driven ―compromise‖ decisions Dred Scott v. Standford, 60. U.S. 393 (1856), and Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).   
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 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (―All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‖).   
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 See Goetting, supra note 124, at 207-208. 
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 The lack of coherence is a long-acknowledged characteristic of Indian law particularly around political 
sovereignty and its relationship to tribes. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political 
Status of Indian Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 153, 154 (2008) (―Implicit in this argument is that the judiciary 
would be stretching its authority and legitimacy by striking down such a vast body of law in one fell swoop. This 
response is indicative of how this area of constitutional and Indian law is superficially theorized.‖) (internal citations 
omitted).   
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silence on tribal sovereignty should presume that the United States‘ creation did not change pre-
constitution sovereignty, because its architects could have expressed their intent to ―conquer‖ 
Indians.
128
 Jurists‘ unwillingness to re-visit the foundational Indian law cases is strange but 
curable. For the sake of argument I will describe this philosophy as the ―Scalia solution.‖129  
The Scalia solution is a case for strict constitutional construction on Indian affairs. It is 
strategic for land liberation because it draws a clean line to full pre-constitutional sovereignty. 
There is limited constitutional text on federal government and Indian affairs, reading that 
Congress hall have the power to: ―To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian tribes.‖130 A narrow textual construction serves to create the 
confines in which Congress may interact—not govern—tribal sovereigns. The approach 
recognizes full pre-constitutional sovereignty, provides for a complementary, judicial re-
interpretation of constitutional text without change to the text itself, and reduces Congress‘ 
legislative discretion from plenary power to diplomacy. Plus, it nullifies convoluted Indian 
jurisprudence, neutralizes the Court‘s arbiter role as Indian policy-makers, and negates broad-
based, non-Indian endorsement of Indian sovereignty as may be required through a constitutional 
amendment.
131
 A true fundamentalist constitutional reading fulfills the land liberation vision by 
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 But see Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (arguing that federal government supremacy over tribes rests on ‗necessary 
concomitants of nationality‘ if not affirmative constitutional powers) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)); Erin Ruble & Gerald Torres, “Perfect Good Faith,” 5 NEV. L. REV. 93 (2004) (arguing 
that federal supremacy over tribes arose not from enumerated constitutional powers but from the structure of 
government necessary to legitimize a new republic on the world stage).   
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 There is a sad irony to this moniker. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361 (dismissing full tribal sovereignty as a view held 
by Justice Marshall that was ―long ago‖ in his majority opinion which held that tribes did not have civil adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over a state official whose alleged misconduct occurred on-reservation despite often traditionalist views 
on textual construction and stare decisis).  
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 Indian Commerce Clause, art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3.  
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 United States v. Carolene Products Co., fn. 4, 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n. 4 (1938) is credited with fortifying 
politically unpopular minorities from majoritarian assault. American Indians, however, for a number of reasons, are 
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restoring full Indian sovereignty and by providing a pragmatic rationale on which to base this 
vision.  
Critics will immediately question the likelihood of a judicial U-turn. While I am under no 
illusion that the Court would not radically change American Indian jurisprudence absent any 
changes in composition or political climate, change is inevitable. The real question becomes in 
which direction change will head, and how it will head that way. A coalition of new Indian-
friendly judges and old strict constructionist judges may make for a more viable likelihood given 
the right case.
132
 Plus, political pressure can play an influential role. Although electoral politics 
should not prescribe sovereignty, political environments undoubtedly affect shape 
jurisprudence.
133
 As political attitudes change and increasing political pressure is applied, a 
future court may exhibit a willingness to revisit its foundational principles.  
Full pre-constitutional judicial restoration is the simplest and truest way to provide for 
co-extensive sovereignty among the United States and tribes. It is also the most consistent with 
American Indian justice as it affirms Indians‘ plurality, preserves Indians‘ autonomy, and 
upholds Indians‘ choice. Short of a remarkable event or a constitutional amendment,134 however, 
there are two other options to at least gradually fulfill the land liberation vision.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not afforded the same kind of jurisprudential protection like other political minorities. The irony, of course, is that 
tribes should not have to condition its sovereignty restoration on non-Indian democratic approval.  
 
132
 See Fletcher, supra note 97, at 165 (observing that Justice Thomas, for example, opined in United States v. Lara 
that Congress may be over-reaching its constitutional authority under the plenary power doctrine and for that reason 
that the court may wish to re-visit the issue.) 
 
133
 See Charles R. Epp, External Pressure and the Supreme Court Agenda in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: 
NEW INSTITUTIONIST APPROACHES 255 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (arguing that outside 
political pressures play an important role as well as institutional factors to influence Justices‘ opinions).  
 
134
 A number of Indian law scholars have proposed constitutional amendments. See, e.g., FRANK POMMERSHEIM, 
BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE CONSTITUTION 307 (2009) (proposing a constitutional 
amendment which emphasizes ―dignity, essential sovereignty, and durable inclusion,‖ stating ―The inherent 
sovereignty of Indian tribes within these United States shall not be infringed, except by powers expressly delegated 
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Judicial Restoration 
The second option for land liberation is judicial restoration. Judicial restoration can 
assume a two-prong strategy: judicial minimalism and judicial restraint. Legal advocates can 
engage in strategic, case-by-case advocacy toward land liberation to unravel harmful, recently-
developed Indian law policies, even if the approach relies on judicial decision-making.
135
  
Recent judicial trends, in particular, have significantly hurt American Indians. This 
option suggests that Indians will fare better with congressional policy-making over judicial 
policy-making by means of judicial inaction. As detrimental as congressional policy-making has 
been for Indians, the judiciary has been arguably worse. The Supreme Court, over time, has 
adopted its own set of incongruous, interpretative policies to make up for Congress‘ lack of clear 
Indian policy.
136
 Matthew L.M. Fletcher has observed although the conservative Rehnquist Court 
correctly doubts congressional plenary power based on existing, narrow constitutional language 
(particularly related to the Commerce Clause
137
) that the Court has chosen to supplement the text 
with extra-constitutional, anti-Indian policies rather than adhere to strict constructionism.
138
 This 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to the United States by the Constitution. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this Article.‖).  
 
135
 It is likely that the larger American Indian advocacy groups are pursuing this objective in some regard, though, I 
am not privy to their internal strategies. This discussion is simply meant to contribute to the broader discussion on 
advocacy strategy.   
 
136
 Remarks from Professor Taiawagi ―Tai‖ Helton, Current Issues in Native American Law, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 
250, 251 (2002) (―While federal policy over the last few decades has shifted repeatedly, the statutes passed in any 
given policy era virtually have been overruled or repealed. As a result, federal Indian law is a complex web of often-
conflicting treaties, statutes, and cases. Courts are often in the difficult position of having to review a statute based 
on the enacting Congress‘s intent and policy, despite the fact that a later Congress expressly repudiated that policy 
and enacted contrary legislation.‖)  
 
137
 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, supra note 97, at 164-166 (explaining that the Supreme Court took great pain, 
departing from all of its other jurisprudence, to strike down Indian-commerce statutes, on the ground that Congress 
exceeded its Commerce Clause authority, for the first time since the Lochner-era).   
 
138
 Id.  
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trend results in gradual and unpredictable tribal sovereignty divesture that makes it difficult to 
anticipate legal outcomes and to preserve tribal governmental integrity.
139
   
Judicial minimalism is a legal philosophy that promotes democratic deliberation over 
policy issues, and one which when applied to Indian tribes may serve as a longer-term strategy 
for sovereignty restoration.
140
 Scholar Sarah Krakoff developed judicial minimalism‘s 
application to Indian law, observing that the previous Court‘s ―minimalist core‖ (O‘Connor, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter) often issued narrow, unitary
141
 holdings that sought to limits the 
judiciary‘s policy influence on Indian affairs.142 Despite other political and institutional forces 
that led these minimalist Justices to issue anti-tribe decisions,
143
 Krakoff compellingly argues 
that a minimalist judicial philosophy paired with a pro-sovereignty commitment may be a viable 
advocacy strategy.
144
  
There are two tactical prongs to this strategy. The first tactic is to explicitly punt policy 
decisions back to Congress as suggested by Krakoff and others. This tactic is strategic insofar 
that Congress has guiding judicial norms from which to deliberate policy choices.
145
 Given the 
Rehnquist Court‘s departure from the Indian law‘s basic tenets, including a presumption of tribal 
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 See LaVelle, supra note 122.  
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 See Krakoff, supra note 120, at 1179; see also id. at 1182-1191.  
 
141
 Krakoff uses the term unitary to describe ―shallow‖ rulings that obscure normative law underlying precedent. Id. 
at 1215.  
 
142
 Id. at 1178-1179.  
 
143
 See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).  
 
144
 But see id. at 1265 (distinguishing between judicial minimalism and incomplete theorization, in which the latter 
is a judicial abrogation of its duty to clearly state jurisprudential underpinnings when norms attached to an issue are 
―up for grabs‖).  
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 Id. (explaining that minimalism is beneficial only if there is the normative law underlying an issue affirms tribal 
sovereignty). 
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sovereignty preservation, judicial minimalism is probably only helpful in a limited set of narrow 
issues.  
The other tactic is consistent with common-sense understandings of minimalism which 
takes the form of judicial restraint.
146
 Judicial restraint can neutralize the Court‘s policy-making 
to mitigate further sovereignty divestment. Sovereignty restoration thus emerges from long-term 
policy neutralization and eventual reversal. Urging judges to exercise restraint may be a plea on 
non-existent ears but it may also appeal to specific judges‘ philosophies or case dispositions. One 
fewer anti-Indian decision is not only one fewer precedential decision—it is another chance to 
fight the political battle outside the courts.  
Both of these judicial restoration tactics strive toward land liberation, though, in a less 
sharp manner than the ―Scalia solution.‖ This option is effective from the view that it keeps a 
judiciary-created problem out of non-Indian democratic control. It also reduces judicial risk-
taking in the sense that the Court need not uproot a body of law. Judicial restraint, with 
whichever tactical approach, curbs extra-constitutional policy-making and allows the Court to 
implicitly repudiate its divestment rulings on tribal adjudicatory authority,
147
 and civil regulatory 
authority
148
 without as much overt politicization.
149
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 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 62 (1999).    
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 See, e.g., Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191; Lara, 541 U.S. at 193.  
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 See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (concluding that tribes‘ inherent sovereignty does 
not extend to hunting and fishing regulation of non-Indians).  
 
149
 It is unlikely that the Roberts‘ Court sees any political cost regarding Indian cases. Should a plurality wish to 
adopt minimalism, it at least insulates the Justices from ―activist judge‖ attacks. This particular Court, however, is 
not shy to engage in so-called judicial activism on one hand. See STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE ROBERTS COURT 53 available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=stephen_gottlieb (―Once again the extreme 
hypotheses are obviously false – everyone votes to apply or uphold Congress some of the time and not others. All of 
the conservatives, however, are more than twice as activist toward Congress as the liberals, and Scalia three times as 
activist toward Congress‖) (internal references omitted).  On the other, it has exercised restraint around political 
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Non-Judicial Restoration 
Legislative restoration is another option that may inspire less skepticism than strict 
constitutional construction or judicial restoration.
150
 This approach does not require any change 
to the Marshall Trilogy or judicial philosophy. Rather, it leaves the plenary power doctrine as 
settled policy. It proposes that Congress may exercise its broadly-conferred powers by legislating 
full sovereignty restoration as a general act or a series of specific acts.
151
 Some may find this 
option more attractive because it seems more feasible than a judicial sea change. Congress, after 
all, unlike the Court, has more ardently supported tribal self-determination during the last thirty 
years during the ―self-determination period.‖152  
Affirmative congressional action may be desirable for two additional reasons:
153
 first, 
shifting Indian policy-making back to Congress returns Indian advocates into an arena in which 
they may actually win in the near future
154—or at least not lose as badly, and second, it offers 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sensitive issues, such as voting rights. See, e.g., Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, (June 
2009) available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/08pdf/08-322.pdf (declining to rule on the 
constitutionality of congressional authority to require federal election oversight over certain jurisdictions deemed to 
have a history of minority voter suppression).   
 
150
 See Lara,  541 U.S. 193 (2004) (Souter, J. dissenting) (stating that there are only two ways that tribes can re-gain 
sovereign powers—express congressional delegation or repudiation of the diminished sovereignty doctrine).  
 
151
 See Tweedy, supra note 49, at 702-711 (proposing that divested powers that may be congressional restored are 
reinstating tribal tax authority on fee lands, reinstating zoning authority on all on-reservation fee lands, and 
reinstating criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who live and are intimately involved with an Indian). 
 
152
 The self-determination era is widely described by scholars and historians as beginning in 1961 until present. See 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 215-257 (David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, & Robert A. 
Williams, Jr. eds., West Group 1998).  
 
153
 I should qualify this paragraph by making clear that I do not believe that non-Indians have the moral right to 
determine Indian policy in its democratic system either through direct electoral vote or in-direct congressional 
action. Given the limitations at hand, however, there seems to be few options for persistent, strong advocacy. 
Lobbying is a short-term solution, and even an essential part to the inevitable transition, from tribal control to full 
sovereignty.  
 
154
 See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice, 
and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 281 (providing an extremely powerful graph displaying favorable 
Supreme Court decisions for tribes from the 1958 to 2000 terms dropping from 80% to below 20%).  
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more hands-on Indian policy shaping and the opportunities for ingenuity. Its main disadvantage 
is that while Congress may be willing to restore limited tribal sovereign powers, it is virtually 
unwilling to wholesale cede its own power, especially without widespread non-Indian constituent 
support.
155
 Any significant political windfall leading to a full-fledged restorative measure is a tall 
order even as national American Indian organizations continue to aggressively advocate for tribal 
sovereignty
156
 Nonetheless, the legislative reform remains an important piece of the larger land 
liberation puzzle.  
Robert Porter offered another suggestion. Porter recommended that advocates lobby 
President Obama to use his executive authority to do Indian justice.
157
 He reminded advocates 
that the Executive should not be an overlooked resource. A progressive administration should be 
put into a position to exert some of its power. He urged policy advocates to pressure the 
President to issue executive orders to restore tribes, transfer tribal land, and direct other 
executive powers toward land liberation. Further, he pointed out that it was a low-risk political 
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 Political pragmatism is a source of heated controversy among Indian law scholars known as the ―Rob-Bob 
Debate.‖ See Robert A. Williams Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and 
Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219 (1986)(criticizing plenary power as 
inherently detrimental to tribal sovereignty and well-being, which must be reversed to approach Indian self-
determination); Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations: An 
Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams’ Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1988) (refuting Professor Williams‘ claim 
that plenary power is inherently detrimental because plenary power is not absolute and harmful to the degree that 
Congress engages in sovereignty divesture); Robert A. Williams Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia: 
A Reply to Professor Laurence’s Learning to Live With the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations, 30 
ARIZ. L. REV. 439 (1988) (responding to Professor Laurence‘s defense of the plenary power doctrine as tolerant of 
the belief that American Indian Nations will never reclaim their fundamental human rights to self-determination).   
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 Unfortunately national Indian advocates have been put on the defensive due to anti-Indian Supreme Court rulings 
in the last ten years. See, e.g., National Congress of American Indians, Tribal Sovereignty Protection Initiative, 
http://www.ncai.org/index.php?id=29&type=123 (describing a multi-faceted campaign designed to promote tribal 
sovereignty through legislation affirming tribal jurisdiction power, grassroots education for tribal governments, 
media awareness effort, and fund-raising to support efforts). See also the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) 
Tribal Supreme Court Project, http://www.narf.org/sct/supctproject.html (describing an effort to coordinate tribal 
advocacy to best fight tribal sovereign divestment).  
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maneuver, as executive orders tend to be more discrete ways to establish administration-favored 
policies.
158
 Most important, while acknowledging that executive power is limited to that which is 
necessary to achieve political emancipation,
159
 presidential leadership does sets the tone for other 
leaders, advocates, and players to seriously consider the land liberation vision.  
The fundamental problem, however, is that under the plenary power doctrine Congress or 
the President can change their minds at the stroke of a pen. Sovereignty with strings, in other 
words, is really no sovereignty at all. It is difficult to accept the something-is-better-than nothing 
rationale when the value of freedom is contingent on its facilitation of enabling a person to 
achieve what one wishes. Given the highly-politicized nature of the American Indian legal 
canon, it seems precarious to rely on the judiciary to do Indian justice. Moreover, advocates 
cannot lose sight that the very vision of land liberation is that non-Indians should not dictate 
Indian life or justice.
160
  
If the American Indian liberation memory—one that invokes pre-colonial freedom—is is 
real, then it cannot be realized through an ephemeral, political fiction. In the same way, if the 
historical memory it is real, it cannot disappear because of outsiders‘ denials. So to the extent 
that provisional sovereignty helps Indian people (as opposed to tribal elite) then it is part of the 
liberation vision. The challenge is to ensure that full emancipation remains in sight.  The ideal 
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 President‘s issuance of executive orders on Indian affairs, especially reservation-related affairs, is a long-time 
practice. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, SIXTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF 
INDIAN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 1892 876-878 (1892). 
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 The Executive branch, from the President‘s executive order power to administrative agency statutory 
enforcement, contains a vast and deep source of power related to tribes. See generally Robert McCarthy, The Bureau 
of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1, 25-138 (2004) 
(carefully detailing the wide array of trust responsibilities which fall under the B.I.A.).  
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 The attempt to re-center federal Indian policy to affirm Indian autonomy is distinct from Sen‘s contention that 
communities do not live exist in isolation. The federal government may still maintain a relationship with Indian 
sovereigns, if sovereigns still choose, but this possibility is much different from the compulsory, guardian-ward 
relationship.  
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political and legal solution to the plenary power problem, therefore, lies in all three strategies, to 
mediate imperialist histories with modern realities. Once legal liberation is achieved, the next 
question—one of functional liberation—then centers our attention.   
The Loss of Trust Problem 
The second major land liberation hurdle is the ―loss of trust‖ problem. This problem 
manifests the real consequences of an imperialist occupier‘s withdrawal161 in three ways: 
strained access to essential resources, internal consensus-building, and outsider predation. Each 
of these challenges is vital to address because the residual impact of withdrawal is potentially 
great. The inherent risks are undeniably present but there are means that may mitigate the 
severity of the transition. Liberation, in a Capability Theory context, must be viewed as the 
continual means to preserve Indian homeland prosperity. In other words, freedom becomes a 
continuum from which choosing the course of action is equally important to realizing a tribe‘s 
capacity to freely survive. Tribes, when referring to land liberation, must be given a true 
opportunity to once again exist as sovereigns, however, such an opportunity must be meaningful.  
Strained Access to Essential Resources 
Adequate federal government appropriations to tribes are a cornerstone to its modern 
fiduciary and land trust responsibilities.
162
 The National Congress of American Indians‘ 
(―N.C.A.I.‖) fiscal year 2010 budget reported a need for billions of dollars for housing, 
education, economic development, historic preservation, tribal governance and other 
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 America‘s occupation in Iraq is a prime example about the risk of deterioration after external occupation and its 
subsequent withdrawal. See Markus E. Bouillon, Ben Rowswell & David M. Moore, Looking Ahead: Preventing a 
New Generation of Conflict in IRAQ: PREVENTING A NEW GENERATION OF CONFLICT 297 (Markus E. Bouillon, Ben 
Rowswell & David M. Moore eds. 2007) (explaining that the fragile-state under Saddam Hussein‘s leadership fell 
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 See NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, INDIAN COUNTRY FY 2010 BUDGET REQUEST 1, available at 
http://www.ncai.org/fileadmin/Final_Budget_Doc.pdf.  
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infrastructural support.
163
 The tangible consequences of sudden, federal-funding stream closure 
are dire when considering that Indian Country has experienced economic conditions comparable 
to the Great Depression for the last 12 decades.
164
 Land liberation, therefore, can be seen as the 
Ultimate Termination policy without careful consideration.
165
 Its impact—intended or not—
could be tantamount to a self-effacing starvation plan for many tribes. The United States‘ federal 
government‘s trust dilemma arises from a centuries-old legacy of compulsory tribal dependency. 
As the federal government has consistently abrogated its trust duty and continues to do so despite 
a renewed commitment to self-determination, federal investment into Indian Country is then 
necessary and obligatory as a form of reparative relief.    
Tribes are entitled to United States reparative relief based on the federal government‘s 
current and on-going trust abrogation as well as decades of past grievances resulting from 
broken promises. Two specific promises come to mind: the government‘s general trust duty to 
support tribes for their land secession
166
  and its fiduciary duty to serve as trustee for land and 
other resources. The federal government has abrogated its general trust duty to support tribes as 
reflected in budget cuts in recent years, yielding an under-funding and termination of vital Indian 
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 Id. (although the budget does not contain a total budgetary figure, ―billions‖ is an estimate from the Executive 
Summary expenditures).  
 
164
 Id. at 8.   
 
165
 There are two meanings to ―termination‖ in this context. In addition to the literal ―termination‖ discussed in this 
section, ―termination‖ may also take on a more abstract meaning, such as the Termination Period (1945-1961) 
whereby Congress expressly tried to assimilate Indians into non-existence. Robert Odawi Porter has argued that 
Indian assimilate-to-terminate agenda undergirds all of various federal government policies over the years. See 
Robert Porter, supra note 51.  
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 ―Secession‖ is a slippery word in the American Indian historical context. This point will be discussed later. But 
trust abrogation has been a consistent pattern in the federal government regardless of the party in power. See 
DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 77, at 181.  
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programs.
167
  Similarly, the federal government has proven to be an irresponsible fiduciary 
trustee that is unable or unwilling to effectively police itself.
168
 For example, the Obama 
Administration finally settled the well-known Cobell case,
169
 the longest running trust 
mismanagement class action lawsuit in U.S. history, in the breath-taking amount of 1.4 billion 
dollars.
170
 The Secretary of Interior is accused of mismanaging oil, gas, and grazing royalties of 
individual Indian beneficiaries since 1887.
171
 The United States‘ ability to ignore its trust 
obligations, and yet, maintain substantial control
172
 over tribes and tribal affairs is unmerited and 
inequitable at best. Indian reparations, therefore, should compensate tribes for previous funding 
shortfalls and continued programmatic funding deficit.
173
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 See NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT‘S FY 2009 BUDGET REQUEST 1 (Feb. 
5, 2008) available at http://www.ncai.org/fileadmin/08_014_budget_analysis1.pdf (citing a potential 8.2% budget 
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 Cobell v. Salazar, No. 08-5500 (D.D.C. 2009) available at 
http://www.cobellsettlement.com/docs/accounting_revived.pdf.  
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 Rob Capriccioso, Obama administration moves to settle Cobell, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Dec. 8, 2009) at 
http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/home/content/78778397.html.  
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 For instance, the Cobell settlement is not finalized until Congress passes authorizing legislation, which to-date, 
has not been completed. See id.  
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 This view may stand in contrast to prevalent views that long-standing Indian claims are inherently ―ancient.‖ See 
Sherrill v. Oneida, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (holding that the equitable remedy of latches applied to Indian claim for tax 
exemption of a land parcel purchased from city within reservation boundaries) (―Generations have passed during 
which non-Indians have owned and developed the area that once composed the Tribe's historic reservation. And at 
least since the middle years of the 19th century, most of the Oneidas have resided elsewhere. Given the 
longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of the area and its inhabitants, the regulatory authority constantly 
exercised by New York State and its counties and towns, and the Oneidas' long delay in seeking judicial relief 
against parties other than the United States, we hold that the Tribe cannot unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty, 
in whole or in part, over the parcels at issue. The Oneidas long ago relinquished the reins of government and cannot 
regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders‖) (Ginsburg, J.) Id. at 203.  
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Reparations are also due for past destructive policies which have impaired tribal 
existence
174
 and economic growth. N.C.A.I. has recently requested funds for ―land 
consolidation‖ in the meager amount of 145 million dollars over six years.175 Land consolidation 
is intended to correct the disastrous late nineteenth century allotment policy
176
 administered from 
1871-1928 which fragmented 130,000 land tracts among 4 million ownership interests.
177
 Tribes 
are precluded from productive land use without owner permission; consequently, purchasing 
land rights is imperative for the future reservation infrastructural economy.
178
  
Finally, reparative relief is due to concretize the federal government‘s official apology to 
American Indians issued in late 2009.
179
 President Obama signed the ―Native American Apology 
Resolution‖ in December, which is, on one hand, a tremendous symbolic victory for tribes. On 
the other hand, the apology was discretely rolled into a defense spending bill to which the 
administration drew no attention.
180
 The resolution included a disclaimer stating that it should 
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 Indian tribal leaders and law scholars have discussed at-length the need for Indian genocidal redress. See, e.g., 
American Indian Movement Grand Governing Council, Press Release: Resolution of Apology (Sept. 21, 1994) AIM 
WEBSITE available at http://www.aimovement.org/moipr/resolution.html. See also Bradford, supra note 23, at 8-10. 
It is important to remember Indian ethnic cleansing in American history; however, I decline to engage in this 
discussion in this article because scholars have thoroughly documented and advocated for redress.  
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 See INDIAN COUNTRY FY 2010 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 162 at 31 (explaining that the American Indian 
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 The 1887 Dawes Act provided for allotment of tribal land to break-up the tribal land base. Allotment established 
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individual property ownership and to open up land for white settlers. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW, supra 141. See also S. LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 71-88 (1973).   
 
177
 Id.  
 
178
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 Rob Capriccioso, A sorry saga, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Jan. 13, 2010) at 
http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/archive/81343107.html. 
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 See Rob Capriccioso, Obama signs apology to Native Americans, but doesn’t say it out loud, nor issue 
announcement, TRUE/SLANT, at http://trueslant.com/robcapriccioso/2010/04/27/obama-signs-apology-to-native-
americans-but-doesnt-say-it-out-loud-nor-issue-announcement/ (observing that the administration issued no press 
releases and have not agreed to a public ceremony as pushed by its Republican sponsor, Sen. Brownback). 
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not be construed as supportive of any legal claims against the United States government.
181
 
Reparative relief offers an earnestness that is absent in the administration‘s disposition thus far. 
It is far from hush-money, as some may say. Paired with land liberation or steps toward it, 
reparations signal a true tide toward tribal self-determination.  
Reparations can also take several forms—monetary restitution, land restoration, and 
rehabilitative relief, for example. Each reparation form is appropriate for a particular claim class. 
Reparations, in other words, is neither a ―one-size-fits-all‖ curative step nor the only step within 
land liberation. Indeed, the provision of diverse reparative relief is critical step toward land 
liberation because it meets the multitude of existing needs among tribes and tribal members. 
Monetary restitution is appropriate for treaty breach damages and interest.
182
 Tribal land 
dispossession largely took place through formal mechanisms such as treaties rather than through 
brute force.
183
 Scholar Nell Jessup Newton qualifies that although some treaties resulted from 
―arm‘s length negotiations‖ that the majority were executed through fraud, duress and under 
other dubious conditions.
184
 While some tribes have brought successful contractual claims to 
federal courts, many more cases have been unsuccessful.
 185
 Moreover, individual claims do not 
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 It should be noted that 5
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 Amendment Takings Clause does not apply to American Indian land claims; therefore, 
no interest is awarded to these claims. See Howard M. Friedman, Interest on Indian Claims: Judicial Protection of 
the Fisc, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 26, 46 (1970). 
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 See cf. FATHER FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: A HISTORY OF POLITICAL ANOMALY 6 
(1994)(―In fact, even though in the beginning the treaties were of diplomatic nature—being negotiated by separate 
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184
 Id. at 459 (arguing that such conditions blurred the line between consent and coercion in treaty and other land 
deal-making). 
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 See, e.g., Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 553.  
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reflect the aggregate material and emotional harm from treaty breaches or wrongful treaty 
agreements that resulted in widespread displacement and death.
186
  
Land restoration, for similar reasons, is appropriate to provide equitable remedy for treaty 
breaches and congressional policies that facilitated land takings. There are, of course, many 
practicalities that emerge from restoring tribal title in large areas of land but feasibility does not 
necessarily detract from the legal entitlement, and certainly from the political-moral 
entitlement.
187
 It was attempted before through the Indian Claims Commission but due to 
numerous factors, including the Commission‘s limited tenure and remedial power, it did not 
effectuate its potential to achieve land liberation.
188
  
Lastly, rehabilitative relief is necessary for tribal stabilization.
189
 Tribes may benefit from 
in-kind resources that will enable tribes to restore customary (or other) legal systems, 
commercial infrastructure, and environmental preservation efforts, in addition to monetary 
restitution and land restoration.
190
 The United States may offer expertise, experience, and other 
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 See Sandra C. Danforth, Repaying Historical Debt: The Indian Claims Commission (Note), 49 N.D. L. REV. 359, 
402 (1973) (stating that the narrow concept of ―just redress‖ set as the Commission‘s mandate was inconsistent with 
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 See William Bradford, supra note 23, at 61 (noting that Justice as Restoration theorists call for rehabilitative 
measures designed to ―nurture the capacity of victim groups to engage in meaningful self-determination‖).  
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 See, e.g., Richard Walker, New technology used for genetic analysis of salmon, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Mar. 
9, 2009) available at http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/archive/40960437.html.Tribal members are also 
trailblazing with technological breakthroughs. See Ron Selden, Blackfeet Entrepreneur delivers the latest computer 
technology, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oct. 2003) available at 
http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/archive/28179964.html (reporting about a Blackfeet member who founded 
Crew Technology Systems to help tribe members learn about cutting-edge computer software). Technological 
transmission among tribes and the United States should be dialectal relationship like with other countries and 
nations across the world.  
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technical knowledge desired by some tribes, which should be made available due to the federal 
government‘s role in dismantling once functional tribal systems.191 Rehabilitative relief may 
alleviate many tribal governments‘ pressures to generate income in a way unlike the other two 
reparative forms.   
The material ―loss of trust‖ problem must be put into perspective. The United States has 
never satisfactorily fulfilled its trust responsibility and is least likely to do so during recessionary 
times.
192
 The federal government continues to nominally support tribal sovereignty and at the 
same time, continues to undermine tribal sovereignty under its legal and bureaucratic systems. 
This contradictory position, defined by forced tribal dependency, correlates with the United 
States‘ political solemnity about tribal sovereignty. Once the United States becomes serious 
about tribal sovereignty it can ensure a careful and adequate tribal transition to full sovereign 
nationhood, primarily through material means. While tribal sovereignty—tribes‘ status as a free 
and independent nations—is not contingent on United States‘ willingness to fulfill its political, 
legal, and moral obligations, tribes are no less entitled to it, and they should no less demand it, as 
a matter of justice.   
The material ―loss of trust‘ problem will ultimately depend on each tribe‘s economic 
circumstances and leadership if the United States fails to take the momentous step toward 
reparative relief. Given that the United States continues to cut tribes‘ funding, however, seeking 
full sovereignty may be more of a political calculation of risk than a mathematical calculation of 
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192
 The foreseeable U.S. deficit is a significant concern to many people, especially Congress. See Lori Montgomery, 
Senate panel approves budget plan with more cuts than Obama’s, WASH. POST (April 23, 2010) available at 
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Obama‘s proposed non-defense spending ―freeze‖).   
  
51 
 
dollars. The political calculus may add up for some tribal leaders—current (dire) economic 
conditions plus potential revenue-generation with sovereignty status may be greater than a future 
of steady federal cutbacks and limited revenue-generation as quasi-sovereigns. Political risk will 
reach a different outcome for others, particularly if economic opportunity and federal 
cooperation have proven to be a lucrative match.
193
  The key point from this section‘s discussion 
is that tribes should be able to choose their economic destinies, especially if either outcome leads 
to scarcity and deprivation. At least full sovereignty, for many tribes, will offer a brighter, freer 
future.  
Internal Consensus-Building  
The internal consensus-building issue is mostly one of procedural justice. There are 
inherent ontological tensions between self-determination and the pursuit of independent 
sovereign status. How can a single sovereign or a collection of sovereigns determine for another 
sovereign that it must establish its independence to fully enjoy its political and legal sovereignty? 
Or alternatively, how can a single sovereign or collection of sovereigns preclude another 
sovereign from its independence? Quite simply, neither scenario should be possible but it is the 
former question that is of most significance to the ―loss of trust‖ problem. This tension between 
self-determination and status is among the biggest challenges for the land liberation vision: how 
to provide the option of full, independent sovereignty without imposing it onto tribes? 
Importantly, tribes must possess the political-will to pursue political emancipation. 
Emancipation cannot legitimately be thrust onto tribes because the United States determines it 
                                                          
193
 Some tribes have substantially profited from Indian gaming, for example. The Foxwoods Resort is the most 
visible Indian gaming ―success story.‖ See, Paul Grimaldi, Economic indicator: Gambling revenue up at Foxwoods, 
PROVIDENCE JOURNAL online (May 11, 2010) available at http://newsblog.projo.com/2010/05/foxwoods-celebrates-
milestone.html (reporting that Foxwoods earned 61.6 million in March which is a 1.3 percent revenue increase from 
a year ago). 
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should be so. Such an outcome directly contradicts self-determination at its core. Nor can the 
United States federal government decide which internal consensus process tribes ought to use. It 
has made this mistake before and it yielded bad results.
194
 Scholar, Rob Dickinson, describes the 
conceptual meaning of self-determination from a legal perspective:    
 
Secession is the ultimate potential result of self-determination, although not the 
only one, and may be defined as ‗the separation of part of the territory of a State 
carried out by the resident population with the aim of creating a new independent 
State or acceding to another existing State.‘  While secession is just one of the 
panoply of outcomes that may pertain under the concept of self-determination, it 
is the one with the most far-reaching consequences, although secession is not of 
itself a right of self-determination.  External self-determination through secession 
may be contrasted with internal self-determination, which may be seen as a 
protection of the right ‗of national or ethnic groups within the state to assert some 
degree of ‗autonomy‘ over their affairs, without giving them the right to 
secede.‘  Internal self-determination can therefore be understood as ‗forms of self-
government and separateness within a state rather than separation (so-called 
‗external‘ self-determination) from the state.‘195 
 
The layered meanings of self-determination are also sufficiently inter-related that it is 
difficult to untangle its practical meaning. An external self-determinative right to secede 
implicates the internal self-determinative right to decide whether to secede and how to do so, for 
example. A rational evaluation does not offer much guidance.
196
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 See Duane Champagne, Remaking Tribal Constitutions: Meeting the Challenges of Tradition, Colonialism, and 
Globalization in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 18 (Eric 
D. Lemont ed. 2006) (―Colonists and the American government have often tried to remake tribal governments in 
their own images. Finding Native government too decentralized, with too many local authorities and leaders, and 
consensual decision-making processes too slow, deliberate, and cumbersome for their tastes and needs, early 
European and American agents worked to establish more centralized authorities and to discourage traditional 
government forms and political processes‖). 
 
195
 See Twenty-First Century Self-Determination: Implications of the Kosovo Status Settlement for Tibet, 26 ARIZ. J. 
INT‘L & COMP. L. 547, 548 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 
 
196
 See MARC WELLER, ESCAPING THE SELF-DETERMINATION TRAP 154 (2008) (noting that the external and internal 
self-determination distinction is slowly dissolving due to a number of ―innovative‖ settlements that re-define the 
meaning of self-determination in a post-colonial context). 
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International law does not smooth this tension either, especially regarding indigenous 
peoples‘ rights.197 The International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 states that a 
people‘s right to self-determination excludes secession.198 Further, the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples‘ Article 3 declares that that indigenous people reserve the right to 
―freely determine their political status,‖ yet Article 46 explains that nothing in the declaration 
should be viewed as an authorization or endorsement of action against the territorial unity of 
states.
199
  
Interestingly, American Indians may be a unique position under international law for two 
reasons. First, American Indians have always been viewed at least nominally as political 
sovereigns, not ethnic minorities,
200
 therefore, if tribes succeed in land restoration—in a legal 
sense—then territorial unity is not threatened. Second, this provision should be read against a 
backdrop of the United Nation‘s goal to avoid ―breaches of peace.‖201 The likelihood of 
widespread physical violence seems low. Even the United States will not engage in a violent 
onslaught against tribes that opt for a changed political status for the entire world to see in the 
age of digitized media. It seems, at the very least, that American Indian tribes may be able to use 
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 Many observers have noted the biting irony that self-determinative (minority) rights are declared in international 
instruments that are written, affirmed, and approved by nation-states. See, e.g., id. at 32 (―The right to opposed 
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 Id. at 24-25 (2008). 
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 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
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 See Ronald Thomas, The Distinct Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia: Deciding the Question of Independence on 
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the Declaration as a guiding source for legitimization in its emancipation pursuit even if its self-
determination definitions remain murky. Advocates must keep in mind, as well, that all 
international law instruments are by-products of political comprise, which are subject to change 
as political winds change.    
Nonetheless, land liberation should encompass a classical self-determination definition 
without legal qualification. In this spirit, tribes should enjoy multiple pathways by which they 
can choose to assert their sovereignty. The Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2010
202
 is an 
interesting model. It provides for a two-part plebiscite
203
 (the first on whether Puerto Rico should 
seek out a different political status and the second listing four political statuses from which 
voters should choose).
204
 American Indian tribes, unlike Puerto Rico, vary in customary and 
modern governance so that a majority voting system may not be appropriate for all tribes.
205
 
Instead, the bill is a reminder that there are a variety of sovereign statuses from which to choose.  
The Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2010 lays out four status options in the second 
plebiscite: independence, sovereignty in association with the United States, statehood, and 
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 See H.R. 2499 111
th
 Congress (April 30. 2010) available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?c111:4:./temp/~c111Av785Y::.  
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204
 Id.  
 
205
 See DELORIA, JR., & LYTLE, supra note 77, at 15 (―While a number of opportunities for Indian revitalization were 
initiated under the IRA, its promise was never fully realized. The era of allotment had taken a heavy toll on the 
tribes. Many of the old customs and traditions that could have been restored under the IRA climate of cultural 
concern had vanished during the interim period since the tribes had gone to the reservations. The experience of self-
government according to Indian traditions had eroded and, while the new constitutions were akin to the traditions of 
some tribes, they were completely foreign to others‖).  
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commonwealth.
206
 As with the full sovereignty discussion earlier, each status assumes various 
sovereignty ―ebbs‖ along a continuum, from independence being the ―highest ebb‖ to 
commonwealth (its present status) being the ―lowest ebb.‖ Commonwealth status is the most 
questionable under international law,
207
 which is very similar to tribal quasi-sovereignty. It vests 
substantial self-governance powers to Puerto Rico but the federal government claims to reserve 
plenary power over Puerto Rico.
208
 Unlike tribes, however, the federal government elects not to 
exercises its legal right as a matter of ―legislative grace,‖ although the United States retains its 
power.
209
 Based on this imprecision, some view Puerto Rico‘s political status as more akin to a 
colonial than a sovereign entity,
210
 and thus, argue that Puerto Rico ought to seek a different 
sovereign status, including full independence.
211
   
Sovereignty with association is perhaps the most curious and least well-known choice 
among the options. It is perceived as an intermediate status between statehood (integration into 
the United States) and independence.
212
 Sovereign powers are divided between an associate body 
and a principal body (United States) and the associate body drafting and implementing its own 
constitution without external interference.
213
 While this may be a viable option for Puerto Rico, it 
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Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1127 (2009). 
 
208
 Id. at 1143-1144. 
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 Id. at 1144. 
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 Id. at 1147-1149. 
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 Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, supra note 207, at 1138. 
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 Id. at 1138-1139. 
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may not appeal to some tribes which experienced the Indian Reorganization Act (―I.R.A.‖). This 
political status seems precariously close to it, though without constitutional template, because the 
theoretical absence of external interference, considering American Indian history, may not 
actually bear out in reality.
214
 Other tribes, on the other hand, may be drawn to this choice 
because it is the closest status that preserves self-determination short of full political 
emancipation. Ultimately, tribes should elect to choose their political status, among these choices 
and all others as consistent with international law, in the matter in which they choose.  
The political will ―loss of trust‖ problem is a complex one, from a legal perspective, 
particularly if it were pursued without the United States‘ consent. Should the United States 
consent or tribes exercise civil disobedience,
215
 the tough theoretical question becomes how can 
all parties proceed while preserving tribal self-determination? The central value implicit in this 
analysis is choice. There are a plethora of reasons why tribes may choose to remain as quasi-
sovereigns or seek a different status whether it is sovereignty with association, independence, or 
something else.
216
 Tribes ought to reserve a choice in status and a choice in how to achieve 
internal consensus regarding the status issue. There may be concerns about elite or majoritarian 
control but it is no more a concern than it is with any other sovereign. This does not mean that I 
dismiss these claims but it means that they are not any more exceptional, and therefore, should 
not alone preclude addressing the political status question. Internal consensus should remain 
fundamentally internal with as little external interference as possible. 
Outsider Predation   
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216
 I excluded ―Commonwealth‖ from this list because there is a compelling case that this status is no more than a 
colony which is now rejected by modern international law.  
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Another ―loss of trust‖ concern is outsider predation. ―New‖ nation-states, particularly 
ones experiencing transition from secession, often exhibit political and economic vulnerability, 
ripe for internal or external exploitation.
217
 External exploitation, by one nation-state or another, 
is the subject of intense ethical and political concern in international law. Encroachment by states 
and individual non-Indians over emancipated tribes is a serious concern in this context, and it is 
an issue that warrants critical examination.    
State encroachment over tribes is a specific and unique concern that arises based on 
tribes‘ historical relationship with states.218 The historical tribal-state relationship derives from 
an early federal protectionist policy articulated in Worcester v. State of Georgia.
219
 Justice 
Marshall declared federal plenary power over Indian affairs to avoid a thorny patchwork of state 
dealings with Indians during the early treaty-making years and to assert federal supremacy over 
states during the Supreme Court‘s infancy.220 The Worcester decision attempted to insulate the 
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 These political and economic vulnerabilities vary, yet international development scholars are yet to fully 
understand the determinants for ―successful‖ states. See S.C.M. Paine, Introduction in NATION BUILDING, STATE 
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220
 Id. at 571 (―Where, by the constitution, the power of legislation is exclusively vested in congress, they legislature 
for the people of the union, and their acts are as binding as are the constitutional enactments of a state legislature on 
the people of the state. If this were not so, the federal government would exist only in name. Instead of being the 
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Indian Commerce Clause against Georgia‘s challenge, which was established to correct an 
Articles of Confederation defect that failed to prohibit state interference with tribes, by declaring 
federal pre-emption over Indian affairs.
221
 Subsequent cases re-affirmed what one scholar calls 
the ―deadliest enemies‖ model222 of tribal-state relations.223 This adversarial relationship between 
states and tribes is the traditional perspective once embraced by courts, Congress, and legal 
scholars.  
More recent examples of tribal-state collaboration, however, are complicating this 
historical picture. Some tribes and states have embarked on joint initiatives to solve common 
problems, such as cross-deputization of law enforcement officers, and specialized, concurrent 
jurisdiction courts for domestic violence and substantive abuse.
224
 Similarly, some tribes and 
states have cooperated well under the Indian Child Welfare Act (―I.C.W.A‖) with the 
implementation of indigenous-based practices to settle tribal-state child welfare disputes.
225
 In 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
proudest mounment [sic] of human wisdom and patriotism, it would be the frail memorial of the ignorance and 
mental imbecility of its framers‖). 
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 See David H. Getches, supra note 154, at 269 (―In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall traced the origins of the 
clause, from the colonies' motives for including a provision dealing with Indians in the Articles of Confederation to 
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 See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that Arizona lacked jurisdiction over a civil lawsuit 
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 See, e.g., Cross-deputization helps solve jurisdictional issues in Oklahoma, INDIAN COUNTRY NEWS (May 28, 
2007) available at http://indiancountrynews.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=603&Itemid=109 
(citing examples of successful collaboration resulting from Chickasaw 28 cross-deputization agreements over 
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89 FEB. MICH. B. J. 23, 25 (2008). 
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some instances, tribes and states are initiating ways in which they can better serve their mutually-
affect citizens, while in other instances, tribes and states seek to improve compulsory 
relationships springing from comprehensive, federal Indian legislation, like I.C.W.A.  
The most notable example of tribal-state collaboration, however, is Indian gaming,
226
 
which was ushered in by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (―I.G.R.A.‖)227 enacted in 1988. The 
twenty-six billion industry
228
 brought jobs and much-needed revenue to many tribes, providing 
funding for schools and other social service programs suffering from federal cuts.
229
 Over 200 
tribes operated 350 gaming establishments in thirty-states in 2005.
230
 It is undoubtedly ―big 
business‖ that some scholars believe presents an opportunity for full tribal sovereignty.231 
Indian gaming has at least nuanced the today‘s tribal-state relations. Tribal-state 
cooperation, after all, is an appealing choice during a period when non-federal jurisdictions face 
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similar limitations from budget deficits.
232
 Experts, Andrew Light and Kathryn Rand argue that 
the Indian gaming phenomenon represents a series of compromises—some bore out of mutual 
agreement between tribes and states and many more through federal and state imposition.
233
 
Tribal-state relations are no longer arms-length, adversarial relationships as much as they are 
perhaps close rivalries.   
Some others argue, however, that Indian gaming is a new phenomenon that it has simply 
re-vitalized an old concept: tribal-state compacts and collaborative agreements.
234
 Gaming 
revenue-sharing compacts arguably represent a more positive turn in tribal-state relations from 
protracted jurisdictional battles of the last hundred years that often led to tribal loss.
235
 Ironically, 
it is I.G.R.A. that severely cripples tribal self-determination, which requires state and local 
municipal revenue-sharing, yet pursuant the Supreme Court Seminole Tribe decision, failed to 
authorize tribes to sue states that fail to negotiate compacts in ―good faith.‖236 As Wendell 
Chino, Chairman of the Mescalero Apache, and Roger Jourdian, Chairman of the Red Lake Band 
of Chippewa generally warned in 1987 before I.G.R.A.‘s passage: ―the implementation of any 
gambling act would infringe upon the sovereign rights of the Indian nations.‖237 
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I.G.R.A. may be regarded as a double-edged sword for tribal sovereignty, fatally sharp on 
both sides. In terms of Indian gaming and tribal relationships, the federal government may be an 
unnecessary ―middle man‖ detrimental to tribes despite the Congress‘ intentions to anticipate 
gaming regulatory and revenue battles.
238
 It is also possible, on the other hand, that the federal 
government‘s preemptory action was a constructive way to afford tribal economic development, 
save for its statutory defect regarding state sovereign immunity. It remains unclear to exactly 
assess the impact on gaming on tribes. Yet it has shown innovation is undeniably at the helm of 
tribal-state relations.  
The broader question is whether recent tribal-state ―success‖ stories translate into the 
silencing of state encroachment fears for all or even most tribes? The answer to this question is 
probably not. States may no longer be tribes ―deadliest enemies‖ but many states are cooperative 
only insofar that they exercise power over tribes.
239
 Forced tribal dependency through I.G.R.A. 
compels tribal leaders to make another set of difficult, unpredictable choices: to venture in 
gaming to raise desperately needed revenue to cure devastating poverty in exchange for 
sovereignty; to march down the road to sovereignty for the purposes of making short-term 
compromises; or to refuse the potential pot of gold entirely.
240
 I.G.R.A., in its present form, is 
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not the model for tribal-state relations. State encroachment remains a persistent problem in light 
of state abuse of tribes and political disenfranchisement resulting from the industrialization of 
Indian gaming.
241
 
The rise of states‘ rights jurisprudence and political rhetoric is of particular concern for 
tribes with long-term aspirations for full sovereignty restoration.
242
 Some conservative forces 
have mounted public campaigns against gaming-enriched tribes, arguing that they are ―abusing‖ 
their sovereignty or gain an unfair advantage over private businesses because of their tax-exempt 
status among other sovereign ―benefits.‖243 These charges are, of course, unfounded, as they are 
seldom based on any knowledge about Indian law, tribal-state relations or Indian Country 
conditions, yet it illustrates non-Indians‘ reluctance to embrace tribes‘ exercise of sovereign 
autonomy (to the extent that it exists). States, political creatures driven by sometimes misguided 
public pressure, cannot be trusted to simply leave tribes alone should they become independent 
sovereigns.  
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Yet there seem to be few options for state constraint. The likely pitfall for state constraint 
options is that they will resemble tribes‘ historical relationships with the federal and state 
governments. If tribes are considered special sovereigns, for example, with full or limited state 
relations, then state encroachment is a potential problem, especially for smaller tribes.
244
 If tribes 
are considered more like foreign sovereigns, then the federal government must lord over tribal-
state relations to reign-in non-compliant states but risk over-reaching so that relations may more 
resemble its present quasi-sovereign relationship.  
Perhaps any diplomatic experimentation should err toward a special sovereign model 
with some sort of federal mechanism that simultaneously monitors states and restricts federal 
authority over tribes and includes close international oversight for a specified duration after tribal 
sovereignty is established. The final consensus on how to constrain state encroachment will 
require much more attention than the short discussion in this article. Nonetheless, state 
encroachment remains a very authentic and chilling reality for the land liberation vision. 
Land Liberation as a Path toward a Free World 
We must not become confused…There is no such thing as military power; there is 
only military terrorism. There is no such thing as economic power; there is only 
economic exploitation. That is all that it is. They try to program our minds and 
fool us with these illusions so that we will believe that they hold the power in 
their hands, but they do not…The Power….We are an extension of the Earth; we 
are not separate from it. We are a part of it…The Earth is a Spirit, and we are an 
extension of that Spirit. We are Spirit. We are Power. They want us to believe that 
we have to believe in them and depend upon them, and we have to assume these 
consumer identities, and these political identities, these religious identities, and 
these racial identities. They want to separate us from our Power.
245
  
-  John Trudell of the American Indian Movement 
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Indeed, the concentration on the transcendental approach has had, I would argue, 
a seriously negative effect on practical discussion of justice in general and global 
justice in particular. We can think of many changes that would manifestly 
advance world justice as we see it, without getting us to a ‗perfectly just world.‘… 
Thus, the theory of justice, as formulated in this transcendental approach, reduces 
many of the most relevant questions of justice in the world as being simply 
inadmissible when they would seem to be the most strongly needed. This is a pity: 
when people across the world agitate to get more global justice, they are not 
clamoring for some kind of ‗minimal humanitarianism.‘246  
- Amartya Sen 
 
 
Justice is something more than reparations, land restoration, or apologies. It is simply the 
possibility of living a peaceful and free life. Colonialism—its physical, cultural spiritual, and 
psychic violence—has made this possibility even harder, though not impossible, for many 
American Indians. Neo-liberalism, once believed to deliver justice, has merely transformed into 
neo-colonialism. It will take the firm commitment to justice, from all people, to escape this 
destructive cycle. As Chippewa-American Indian activist, Winona La Duke said, ―[w]e can no 
longer say, ‗it‘s too bad that those things are happening to those people, but it couldn‘t happen to 
us.‘‖247 Unrealized justice is the lock of the shackles that all communities wear.  
A full appreciation of justice is to understand the plenary power and ―loss of trust‖ 
problems. Each problem presents its own set of solvable legal and political challenges. They are 
ones that bear transformative potential should the opportune conditions arrive. Opportune 
conditions do not appear, however, they are made. Plenary power, advocates must remember, is 
a man-made construct that can also be unmade. Advocates must remember, too, that the tribal-
United States‘ trust relationship was never real, but a shadow of a promise, that ought to be fully 
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realized or not. The superficial humanitarianism myth, expressed by Amartya Sen in this 
section‘s epigraph, is a dangerous fiction that should no longer placate justice-seekers. Justice is 
whole and pervasive like the air we breathe, and like the metaphysical water in which the fish of 
nyaya swim.   
Robert Porter‘s land liberation vision, from legal and political perspectives, inspires 
advocates to think critically and creatively about these challenges and their aims. This vision, 
paired with Capability Theory, center four ethical values: dynamism, pluralism, flexibility, and 
responsiveness. Each land liberation-inspired idea should nurture these four values in its justice 
pursuit. Similarly, land liberation strategy should view each pursuit from a Realist position in 
which every effort symbolizing a tool designed to dismantle the colonists‘ weapon: the 
separation of people from Power. In more concrete terms, as Indian advocates fight for legal 
justice, they can also re-shape the very bureaucracy created to control Indians.  
This section intended to lay out a Capability-centered, theoretical discussion within a 
land liberation visionary context, generally. The last section intends to further explicate several 
possibilities in the human-rights and global justice contexts. 
Part IV. Capability-Centered, Land Liberation Possibilities  
What does all this mean for land liberation as a political strategy during a national and 
global transitory era? It may mean that tribes need fuller sovereignty to better address changing 
internal conditions and needs; that the United States must recognize all Native Nations, Bands, 
and Collectives, as existing, self-governing entities; and that international law and the 
international community must play a more effectual role in demanding indigenous justice. These 
necessary changes should ultimately lead to land restoration, reparative relief, and potentially 
political emancipation, to reach tribal-United States co-extensive sovereignty. There is no single 
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road to take but there are several possibilities within reach. In this section, I deliberately focus on 
concrete Executive and Congressional action that can facilitate land liberation. As mentioned 
earlier, I argue that the appropriate role for non-Indians in the land liberation vision is serving as 
allies, which translates into demanding Indian justice from the non-Indian powers-that-be 
alongside Indian advocates. The following section contains several briefly-discussed ideas that 
speak to this point.  
What the President Can Do 
President Obama can assert his power as Chief Executive to do Indian justice. There are 
at least two Department of Interior directives that he can issue by executive order that are 
consistent with the land liberation vision.  
First, President Obama can expedite federal tribe recognition petitions. The federal tribe 
recognition process is widely acknowledged as broken.
248
 Only eight percent of currently 
recognized tribes have been approved through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (―B.I.A‖.) regulatory 
process since 1960.
249
 Several hundred tribes are reportedly waiting on federal recognition, many 
of which will be unable to meet the rigorous criterion that requires extensive historical and 
anthropological data.
250
 The President should direct the B.I.A. to reform its regulatory rules to 
facilitate the recognition process, and set a deadline by which the B.I.A. must report to the White 
House of its progress before the end of the administration‘s term.  
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Second, President Obama should fully fund land consolidation and the protection of land 
use rights. The elimination of IIM accounts should substantially save the Office of the Special 
Trustee (―O.S.T.‖) at the Department of Interior in administrative costs. The OST does not 
charge administrative fees for the 131,600 IIMs that carry $15 or less, which OST claims often 
costs more in maintenance than the account itself. This funding and any Department of Interior 
discretionary funding should be re-directed to satisfy statutory-mandated spending for the land 
consolidation and land use rights‘ protection programs. The National Conference for American 
Indians reports that the Trust National Resources and Real Estate Service Programs, requiring at 
least 19.2 million for water resource and rights protection, were at-risk for a one-fourth budget 
cut in 2010.
251
 Moreover, the Rights Protection Program, which funds 49 tribes treaty and 
adjudicatory rights enforcement in the Pacific Northwest and Great Lakes regions, were at-risk 
for reduction to 2004 levels from approximately $22.2 million to $19.8 million, which is a 26 
percent decrease.
252
 The President should ensure that these programs are fully funded in the 
amount of at least $41.4 million.  
President Obama, the ―change‖ champion, can do significant Indian justice without 
risking political capital.
253
 It is also apparent that the Executive‘s powers are inevitably limited. 
The Executive is but one of three federal branches that handles Indian affairs. Still, at the same 
time, it is the most accessible for Indian advocates who have had variable success with Congress 
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and courts in recent years. Perhaps President Obama‘s leadership can set a positive political tone 
in the years to come.  
 
 
 
Other Possibilities  
Congress is probably the other most accessible branch to Indian advocates.
254
 There were 
at least 65 Native bills introduced during the 111
th
 Congress, most of which were pro-Native, 
including the Native American Business Development Enhancement Act of 2009, Unrecognized 
Southeast Alaska Native Communities Recognition and Compensation Act, Native Hawaiian 
Government Reorganization Act of 2009, Southeast Alaska Native Land Entitlement Finalization 
Act, and Job Creation Through Entrepreneurship Act of 2009.
255
 Most of these bills, however, 
did not have many co-sponsors, and many also died in committee. There does not seem to be any 
landmark Native or Indian sovereignty legislation on the congressional horizon.  
Interestingly, the most important Native legislative development this year is a non-Native 
bill: the previously discussed Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2010. Indian advocates, on the coat 
tails of this legislation‘s passage in the House, may demand a Sovereignty Taskforce to examine 
the unique issues faced by non-sovereign Nations and Peoples under United States legal control, 
including American Indian tribes, Native Hawaiians, Alaska Natives, Guam, American Samoa, 
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Midway Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Puerto Rico.
256
 
Although a taskforce alone may not actualize many concrete changes, it can facilitate a broader 
sovereignty discussion, which is essential to any congressional movement on American Indian 
justice.  
Lastly, one of the most important congressional legislation for land liberation is 
American Indian Probate Act‘s Land Consolidation Program appropriation renewal. This 
Program‘s funding is set to expire this fiscal year.257 The Consolidation Program allows tribes to 
slowly re-build their land base short of an executive order or other congressional action on land 
restoration.  
There is always, of course, non-conventional action toward land liberation. Tribal 
community leaders will continue to re-claim land
258
 and resist sovereignty divestment.
259
 I will 
not speculate on these possibilities because Indian community leaders can speak for themselves, 
and because, really, the possibilities are boundless. Indian liberation allies should be prepared to 
support the creative range of individual, communal, and collective action that may explode over 
the next decade.  
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Finally, a word on international law. Renowned international indigenous rights law 
scholar, S. James Anaya, convincingly argues that indigenous rights has ―gained a foothold‖ 
within the human rights framework, in contrast to the normative nation-state sovereignty 
framework,
260
 by noting that some international systems have been welcoming to human rights 
demands from indigenous peoples.
261
  Anaya advocates, despite the overture of critical voices 
about the prospect of change through international law,
262
 a ―realist interpretative‖ approach that 
supports the integration of indigenous rights into normative human rights standards, which 
increasingly considers claims against the norms of overall context, the body of larger 
international law, and the maximization of human rights (known as pro homine principle).
263
 The 
Realist trend is as promising as any local, regional, and national indigenous rights developments 
in the United States and elsewhere. Moreover, it approximates Sen‘s ―Impartial Spectator‖ 
mechanism that seeks to minimize the influence of vested interest and eradicate the impact of 
local parochialism. Mounting internal and external pressure for indigenous rights is the justice-
making encompassed within the capability-centered, land liberation vision. 
Conclusion 
Land liberation is an ages-old struggle against American colonialism. It is not an original 
idea but one that is revitalized during a transitory period defined by justice. The new 
contributions by long-time, East Indian, justice-seeker, Amartya Sen, may lead the human rights 
movement into its twenty-first maturity, as American Indian pioneering intellectuals, like Robert 
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Porter, attempt to place persisting American Indian tribes‘ justice demands into the human 
rights‘ era context. This article explained receding political philosophy justice theories; discussed 
their shared flaws with neo-liberalism and its demise; de-constructed Sen‘s emerging theory of 
justice; fleshed out an iteration of the land liberation vision and implications; and finally, offered 
a glimpse into concrete possibilities within the land liberation vision, toward the goal of situating 
the two visions as ones that are directed toward similar—not competing—aims. For in the words 
of one Native leader and Dene member, George Erasmus, ―The only thing that is going to 
guarantee a new society is solidarity, allies who have a dialogue, who can learn from each 
other.‖264    
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